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1.  Introduction. Goal, thesis and work structure 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The digital protection technique of today joins knowledge not only from its 
own field, but also from the fields of digital signal processing, power 
quality, theory of variability and estimation, fuzzy logic and artificial 
intelligence. The basic principles of the function of the modern numerical 
protection technique are still the same as mechanical or analogue 
electrical protection devices, although the methods of the data processing 
and evaluation are changing with the development of the implemented 
software. The main function of the power system protection is keeping the 
system in a functional unity according to the secure power system 
operation principle e.g. (n-1) principle. The protection technique is still 
confronted with the demands of selectivity, effectivity, sensitivity, 
reliability, and it must be fast and inexpensive. The costs of the protection 
systems depend on the type of protection device used. The lowest costs 
have devices that use the over-current principle. For the connection to the 
protecting element they need only current transformers. The 
implementation of the time-gradation and direction principle to this type 
of protection improves the selectivity on the cost of the price of the 
devices. A further improvement is the criteria of distance-to-the-fault 
calculation. This protection system requires use also of voltage 
transformers. The best selectivity offers differential protection, but the 
costs rise because of the need for a communication link on both sides and 
additional necessary backup functions. 
Normally, in power system, a functionally suitable protection system is 
joined to each electrical element (passive or active) e.g. power line ? 
distance protection system, transformer ? differential protection system, 
small electrical motor on the medium voltage level ? over-current 
protection system. To fulfil the requirements of selectivity, the protection 
system realised as primary and back-up protection joins different 
protection system types in a logical structure e.g. differential, over-
current, distance.  
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As a result of the conclusions set within the Kyoto Protocol, a worldwide 
initiatives concerning environmental pollution and world energy 
dependence on limited energy resources are being carried out. In this 
chain of initiatives the distribution networks have witnessed relatively fast 
changes in their structure. Beginning with the liberalisation of the energy 
markets, and especially due to the implementation of decentralised and 
renewable energy resources (DER) into the network, the network 
structure is changing from centralised to decentralised. In a network with 
high penetration of DER, the direction of power flow, which was clearly 
defined before, changes according to the ratio of energy offered from DER 
and the power system on the higher voltage level and the energy demand 
from the network costumers. However the protection systems installed in 
the power system are not set to manage these variable changes of 
direction of power flow. Because of the lack of “powerful” generators that 
can create a strong network, such a network characterises by a very low 
short circuit power, which is definitely going to affect the protection 
system. The protection devices implemented in the network are about to 
be set to match these changes. Consequently new protection concepts for 
each system are necessary. These problems are discussed in this 
dissertation. 
 
1.2 Goals, thesis and work structure 
 
The goals of this dissertation are:  
• investigation of new situations in power systems with high 
penetration of DER; 
• analysis of present protection algorithms taking into account the 
high penetration of DER; 
• investigation of protection concepts in networks with high 
penetration of DER. 
For the realisation of these goals some examplary networks are used to 
discuss the occurring problems and the solving methods, they don’t 
present a generalisation of the problems of protection schemes in 
networks with high penetration of DER, but play only an illustrative role. 
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In the examplary networks the DER are connected to the network via 
inverters. 
The thesis of this work is that it is possible to operate the power system 
with high penetration of DER (theoretically) with actual protection 
schemes, when some special effects concerning the protection scheme 
and the connection of DER to the network are taken into account. 
This work will be presented as follows. 
Chapter 3 presents the basic definitions concerning digital protection. This 
chapter presents the structure of the protection systems and the 
functional principle of different types of protection systems used in 
distribution systems. 
Chapter 4 analyses the basic problems concerning protection concepts in 
medium voltage networks with high penetration of DER. This chapter 
presents the possibilities of installation of DER in medium voltage 
networks. The modelling of DER for protection coordination purposes is 
also given. 
Chapter 5 presents an investigation of different protection algorithms 
implemented in protection relays in networks with high penetration of 
DER. The focus of the investigations is the influence of the high amount of 
harmonics in such networks on the protection systems. The influence of 
high amount of harmonics on different types of protection relays and 
different algorithms is going to be presented. The investigations have 
been made theoretically, as simulations, as well as practically, in the 
network protection laboratory at the Otto-von-Guericke-University. 
In Chapter 6, the protection concepts before and after the implementation 
of DER are analysed and compared on example of two distribution 
networks. The problems of lack of protection in islanded operation are 
shown, as well as possible idea solutions for the network protection. 
Chapter 6 presents also two protection concepts for power system 
protection in networks with high penetration of DER. These concepts are 
mostly based on the new standard for substation automation system - IEC 
61850. The second concept presents an idea of protecting distribution 
networks using an additional signal injection. 
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The investigations are completed by an e-learning course, in the area of 
digital network protection, presented in Chapter 7. This e-learning course 
has been implemented as an addition to the conventional study program 
at the Otto-von-Guericke-University. 
 5 
2. Einleitung. Ziele, These und Struktur der Arbeit 
 
2.1 Einleitung 
 
In der modernen Netzschutztechnik wird Fachwissen verschiedenster 
Wissensfelder wie digitale Signalverarbeitung, Spannungsqualität, 
mathematisch basierte Theorien über Variabilität und Einschätzung, Fuzzy 
Logik und künstlicher Intelligenz verwendet. Die grundsätzlichen 
Funktionsprinzipien moderner Schutzsysteme sind immer noch die 
gleichen geblieben wie bei den mechanischen oder analog-elektrischen 
Schutzrelais, obwohl die Methoden der Signalverarbeitung sich stark 
geändert haben. Die Hauptfunktion der Schutzsysteme ist gleichgeblieben 
– Haltung des elektroenergetisches Systems in einer Einheit unter 
Berücksichtigung des sicheren Betriebsprinzip, z.B. des (n-1) Prinzips. 
Zusätzlich werden den Schutzsystemen folgende Anforderungen gestellt: 
Selektivität, Effizienz, Sensibilität, Zuverlässigkeit, Schnelligkeit und 
Kosten optimiert. Die Kosten der Netzschutzsysteme hängen von der Art 
des benutzen Schutzgerätes ab. Die Netzschutzsysteme, die das 
Überstromprinzip nutzen, sind am Preis günstigsten. Die Integration der 
Kriterien von Zeit- bzw. Stromstaffelung und Richtung verbessern die 
Selektivität des Netzschutzsystems, erhöhen aber die Kosten. Eine weitere 
Verbesserung der Selektivität wird durch das Impedanzermittlungsprinzip 
erreicht. Diese Distanzschutzsysteme benötigen aber zusätzliche 
Spannungswandler. Die beste Selektivität wird mit 
Differenzialschutzsystem erreicht, wobei die Kosten des Systems wegen 
der zusätzlichen Kommunikationsleitungen steigen.  
In der Energietechnik ist üblicherweise jedem elektronischen, aktiven, 
oder passiven Element ein passendes Hauptschutzsystem zugeordnet. Z. 
B. Leitung ? Distanzschutzsystem, Transformator ? 
Differentialschutzsystem, kleiner el. Motor an Mittelspannungsebene ? 
Überstromzeitschutzsystem. Um die Anforderungen bezüglich Selektivität 
zu erfüllen, im Sinne von Primär- und Sekundärschutz, wird das 
Netzschutzkonzept mit logischer Verbindung mehrerer Schutzsysteme, 
z.B. Differential, Überstrom, Distanz realisiert.  
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Als Folge des Kioto–Protokolls wurde eine weltweite Initiative zum 
schonenden Umgang mit den Naturenergiequellen ins Leben gerufen. 
Diese Initiative löste eine Kettenreaktion aus, welche unter anderen 
Veränderungen in den Verteilungsnetzen zur Folge hat. Ausgelöst durch 
die Liberalisierung der Energiemärkte und mit steigender Anzahl 
dezentraler und erneuerbarer Energieerzeuger am Netz, ist sich die 
Netzstruktur in eine dezentrale am Umwandeln. In Netzen mit hohem 
Anteil an dezentralen Energieerzeugern (DER) kann sich die Richtung des 
Lastflusses in der Abhängigkeit des Quotienten der Energieerzeugung (aus 
DER und dem überlagerten Netz) und des Energieverbrauches ändern. Die 
bestehenden Netzschutzsysteme sind hierfür nicht parametrisiert und 
können die schnellen Änderungen der Lastflussrichtung nicht bewältigen. 
Diese Netze charakterisieren sich durch kleine Kurzschlussleistung, die die 
Funktionalität der Netzschutzsysteme gefährden kann. Die eingesetzten 
Netzschutzsysteme mit neuen Konzepten werden diese 
Herausforderungen erfüllen. Diese Probleme werden in dieser Dissertation 
untersucht.  
 
2.2 Ziele, These und Struktur der Arbeit 
 
Die Ziele dieser Dissertation sind:  
• Untersuchung der neuen Situationen in Energiesystemen mit hohem 
DER-Anteil;  
• Analyse unterschiedlicher Schutzalgorithmen unter Berücksichtigung 
hohen DER-Anteil; 
• Untersuchung der Netzschutzkonzepte in Energiesystemen mit 
hohem DER-Anteil. 
Zur Realisation dieser Ziele werden einige Beispielnetze benutzt, um die 
Probleme und die möglichen Lösungen zu präsentieren. In den 
Bespielnetzen sind die DER über einen Umrichter ans Netz gebunden. Die 
untersuchungten Lösungen präsentieren keine Generalisation der 
Probleme verbunden mit Netzschutzkonzepten in Netzen mit hohem DER 
Anteil, sondern haben eine illustrative Rolle.  
 7 
Die These ist: Mit dem bestehenden Netzschutzkonzepten ist es möglich 
das Energiesystem mit hohem Anteil von DER (theoretisch) zu betreiben, 
aber einige spezielle Effekte im Bezug auf die Netzschutzkonzepte sowie 
die Art der Anbindung von DER ans Netz, müssen unter Berücksichtigung 
genommen werden. 
Die Arbeit ist wie folgt gegliedert.  
Kapitel 3 präsentiert die Grundlagen der Netzschutztechnik. Die Struktur 
der unterschiedlichen Netzschutzsysteme in der Mittelspannungsebene, 
sowie ihrer Funktionalitätsprinzipien werden erläutert.  
Kapitel 4 analysiert die Grundprobleme der Netzschutzsysteme in Netze 
mit hohem DER Anteil. Dieses Kapitel präsentiert die Möglichkeiten der 
Anbindung von DER an das Mittelspannungsnetz. Die Modellierung von 
DER für Netzschutzkoordination, ist ebenfalls untersucht. 
Kapitel 5 zeigt die Untersuchungen unterschiedlicher 
Netzschutzalgorithmen in Netzen mit hohem Anteil von DER. Der Fokus 
der Untersuchungen ist auf einem hohen Anteil von Harmonischen gelegt. 
Die Beeinflussung unterschiedlicher Algorithmen durch hohe Anteile an 
Harmonischen ist mit Hilfe von Simulationen theoretisch untersucht 
worden. Eine praktische Prüfung fand im Netzschutzlabor an der Otto–
von- Guericke-Universität statt. 
In Kapitel 6 sind die Netzschutzkonzepte beispielhaft an zwei 
Verteilungsnetzen, jeweils vor und nach der Anbindung von DER 
präsentiert und verglichen worden. Die Probleme der heutigen 
Netzschutzkonzepte in Inselfall werden gemeinsam mit einigen 
Lösungsstrategien präsentiert. 
Kapitel 6 erläutert auch die Netzschutzkonzepte für Verteilungsnetze mit 
hohem Anteil an DER. Diese Konzepte basieren auf dem neuen Standard 
für das Substation Automation System-IEC 61850. Das zweite Konzept 
präsentiert eine Idee eines Netzschutzkonzeptes in Verteilungsnetzen mit 
zusätzlicher Signal-Injektion. 
Die Untersuchungen sind mit der Realisation eines E-learning Kurses in 
dem Bereich Digitaler Netzschutz abgerundet und in Kapitel 7 dargestellt. 
Dieser E-learning Kurs ist zusätzlich in den Lehrgang im Bereich 
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Netzschutz und Hochspannung an der Otto–von–Guericke-Universität 
aufgenommen worden. 
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3. Digital protection in distribution networks 
 
3.1 General information about protection systems 
 
A general requirement of any power supply system is that it has to be well 
designed and properly maintained in order to achieve an acceptable level 
of reliability, quality and economic price of the electricity supplies as well 
as to limit the number of faults that might occur during operation. A 
number of ancillary systems are present in the distribution systems to 
assist in meeting these requirements. The most important of these are the 
protection systems, which are installed to clear faults in network operation 
and limit any damage to distribution network equipment [1]. Automatic 
operation of protection systems is necessary to isolate faults on the 
networks as fast as possible in order to minimise damage. The economic 
costs and benefits of a protection system must be considered in order to 
present a suitable balance between the requirements of the protective 
scheme and the available financial resources [2]. The requirements set to 
the implemented protection system may be summarised in the following: 
• reliability: the ability of the protection to operate correctly. It has 
two elements: dependability – a certainty of correct operation when 
a fault occurs, and security – an ability to avoid incorrect operation ; 
• speed: minimum operating time to clear a fault in order to avoid 
damage; 
• selectivity: maintaining continuity of supply by disconnecting the 
smallest possible section of the network necessary to isolate the 
fault; 
• costs: maximum protection capabilities at the lowest price possible. 
A compromise is required to obtain the optimum protection system. A 
properly coordinated protection system is necessary to ensure that an 
electrical distribution network can operate within the requirements for 
safety of equipment, staff and public, and the network overall [3].  
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3.2 General information about numerical protection 
 
The former protection systems have used protective relays and worked 
according to the law of electromagnetic force. After wide implementation 
of the microprocessor technique, the numerical protection systems were 
introduced. Numerical protection devices operate on the basis of sampling 
inputs and controlling outputs to protect or control the monitored system. 
Network currents and voltages are sampled one at a time [1]. After 
acquiring samples of the input signals, calculations are realised in 
algorithms to convert the sampled data into a final decision in order to 
identify a fault. The numerical protection devices are multifunctional and 
can be regarded as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). Programmable 
input-output (I/O), extensive communication features and an advanced 
human-machine interface (HMI), provide easy access to the available 
features [2]. Here are some of the characteristics of numerical protection 
devices: 
• reliability: lower incorrect operations compared with the 
conventional protection devices; 
• self- diagnosis: is realised as a watchdog circuitry, which includes 
memory checks and analogue input tests; 
• event and disturbance records: by a realised protection function, 
energising of a status input, hardware failure. Records include also 
all status input and output information; 
• integration of other digital systems: e.g. communications, 
measurement and control for a reliable substation operation; 
• adaptive protection: the settings of the protection device can be 
changed according to the operational conditions of the network (real 
time situations). 
In the following section a typical structure of a numerical protection device 
is discussed. The main modules are:  
• microprocessor: responsible for processing the protection 
algorithms. It contains the memory module, which includes the 
following components: 
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o RAM (random access memory) with the functions: retaining 
the information data that is input to the processor and is 
necessary for storing information during the calculation of the 
protection algorithms. 
o ROM (read only memory) or PROM (programmable ROM) for 
storing programs permanently. 
• input module: for receiving the input signal and proceeding them to 
the microprocessor. The module contains: analogue filters, realised 
as low band pass for elimination of higher harmonics; signal 
conditioner which converts the signal from the current transformers 
(CTs) into a DC signal; analogue/digital (A/D) conditioner: which 
converts the DC signal into a digital signal which is then sent to the 
microprocessor, or communications buffer. 
• output module for: sending the microprocessor response signals to 
the external elements (e.g. tripping command to a circuit breaker). 
• communications module: contains series and parallel ports to permit 
the interconnection of the protection device with the control and 
communication systems of the substation. 
The basic structure of a digital protection device is presented in Fig. 3.1.  
 
Fig. 3.1: Basic structure of a digital protection device 
The most important standard functions of numerical protection devices are 
[3,4]: 
• protection functions: directional/non-directional three-phase over-
current; directional/non-directional earth-fault current; negative-
Measurements 
(Adaptation of measured 
values, Filtering, Sample 
& Hold, A/D conversion) 
Microprocessor 
(RAM and PROM) 
Tripping command 
Output signals 
u (t) 
i (t) 
Power supply 
Communication 
port 
Display Keypad 
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phase-sequence over-current; directional power; over-excitation; 
over- and under-voltage; over- and under-frequency; distance; 
differential; breaker failure; breaker monitoring and automatic re-
closing; 
• measurement functions: three-phase voltages and currents are 
measured, digitally sampled, and the fundamental component is 
extracted using a discrete Fourier transformation (DFT). Frequency, 
power factor, apparent power, reactive and active power can also be 
measured;  
• control functions: for sending a tripping command to the circuit 
breaker; 
• communication: A communication port on the protection device 
front panel provides a temporary local interface for communication. 
Communication ports and the panel provide a permanent 
communication interface. Panel communication ports can be 
connected to computers, terminals, serial printers, modems, and 
intermediate logic communication/control interfaces.  
 
3.3 Functional principle of over-current protection 
 
Over-current protection is one of the most used protection principles 
implemented as a protection of: power lines, cables, transformers and 
motors. This type of protection can be used as a primary as well as a back 
up protection (Fig. 3.3). Used as a primary protection, the over-current 
protection has the task of sending an immediate tripping command when 
the fault is inside the protective zone, and as a back up protection to send 
the command after a set graded time (if the primary protection for the 
fault hasn’t reacted). For implementation in a network with multiple 
infeeds, a direction criteria is necessary [5].  
There are two principles of over-current protection: definite-current and 
inverse time principle (Fig. 3.4). The definite-current protection device 
operates instanteneously when the current reaches a predetermined value 
(I>, I>>) and the set time has passed (TI>, TI>>). The setting is chosen so 
that, at the substation furthest away from the source, the protection 
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device will operate for a low current value and the protection device 
operating currents are progressively increased at each substation, moving 
towards the source. Thus, the protection device with the lowest settings 
operates first and disconnects load at the point nearest to the fault. This 
protection is not very selective at high values of short circuit current [6].  
 
Fig. 3.3: Implementation of over-current protection 
 
The fundamental property of the inverse time protection devices is that 
they operate in a time which is inversely proportional to the fault current. 
Their advantage over definite time, and definite current protection devices 
is that, for very high currents, much shorter tripping times can be achived 
without a risk to the protection selectivity. They are also divided into 
inverse, very inverse and extremely inverse [5]. 
 
Fig. 3.4: Types of over-current protection 
 
Over-current protection 
As primary protection As secondary protection 
In radial networks with 
power supply from one side  
In meshed networks with 
already present distance 
or differential protection  
 14 
3.4 Functional principle of distance protection 
 
Distance protection is one of the most important types of network 
protection, concerning protecting a line. The distance protection device is 
connected generally via voltage and current transformers to the protected 
line [2]. The distance protection device monitors this line, if a fault on the 
line occurs it should send an immediate tripping command to the circuit 
breaker on the line to trip. The system of distance protection is presented 
in Fig. 3.5. All of the system components must be present in the scheme 
to fulfil the protection task [4]. 
 
 
1) Adaptation of measured data (CT and VT) 
2) Transportation of measured data 
3) Data acquisition main & back-up protection 
4) Control system 
5) Circuit breaker 
6) Auxiliary system (Battery) 
Fig. 3.5: System components of the distance protection device 
 
The selectivity of disconnection is achived by calculating the distance from 
the placing point of the protection device to the fault. Using time grading 
the distance protection can be used as a back up protection for further line 
parts or other upcoming lines [8]. The distance protection device can also 
be set in two directions: forward (as shown in Fig. 3.5 and Fig. 3.6), and 
reverse, for example as a backup protection for a generator, or 
transformer [4].  
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6 6
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Fig. 3.6: Protection zones of the distance protection at bus bar A 
 
R
X
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Fig. 3.7: Tripping characteristic of a distance protection device 
 
For calculating the distance to fault (impedance) the distance protection 
device needs the input values of the three-phase voltage and current, 
which can be measured at the placing point of the protection device (3.1). 
A total of 6 voltages and 6 currents values are measured (phase to phase 
and phase to neutral values).  
meas
meas
I
UZ =           (3.1) 
With the calculation of the impedance, the distance to fault can also be 
calculated. The tripping command is sent when the calculated value of the 
impedance is within the specially designed and paramertised tripping 
characteristic (Fig. 3.7). In Fig. 3.7 a polygonal characteristic is 
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presented. Some distance protection relays also use MHO (inverse Ohm) 
characteristics, cycle characteristics, etc.  
 
3.5 Functional principle of differential protection 
 
Differential protection is connected on both terminals of the protected 
element via current transformers (Fig. 3.8). The functional principle of this 
type of protection is to send an immediate tripping command to both 
circuit breakers only when the fault is within of the protective zone [3]. 
This protection should not operate for external faults (no back up 
protection function is possible). 
 
Fig. 3.8: Functional principle of differential protection 
 
 
Fig. 3.9: Tripping characteristic of a differential protection device 
 
IDIFF
ISTAB
Tripping area
Tripping characteristic  
of differential protection device
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Differential Protection 
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i1 i2 
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The functional principle of the differential protection is based on the 
electromechanical principle of balancing. Two parameters are defined: 
differential current (3.2) and stabilising current (3.3), defined as follows:  
Differential current:  IDIFF = ⏐ I1 + I2 ⏐    (3.2) 
Stabilisation:   ISTAB = ⏐I1⏐ + ⏐I2⏐   (3.3) 
The tripping characteristic is presented in the function (3.4). 
IDIFF,pick up = f(ISTAB)         (3.4) 
This type of protection has very high selectivity, high speed and is mostly 
used for protecting transformers, generators, and short lines (distance 
protection is not easy to realise). The differential protection can be 
realised either as a comparison between moment values of the two 
measured signals or as a comparison of the phases of the two measured 
signals. The disadvantage of using the differential protection is the need of 
pilot wires for communication between both protection devices forming 
the differential protection principle [5].  
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4. The implementation of DER in the network and its 
influence on digital protection 
 
4.1 Introduction. General information of the technologies of DER 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s the concept of „sustainability“ has been 
the topic of discussions, when the topics of sparing acquaintance with the 
nature and the worldwide justifier distribution of the prosperity and wealth 
matters. With this the concept sustainable development includes and 
considers ecological, economical and social aspects [27,28]. The motto of 
sustainable development is, that „the lifestyle demands of the generations 
of today should be fulfilled without reaching after the possibilities of the 
future generations“. After the liberalisation of the energy markets, the 
power companies were confronted with each other and the energy 
customers got the freedom of choice for the question of power supply. The 
utilities are confronted with the following:  
• accomplishment of the increasing energy import dependancy; 
• managing the energy mix and climate protection goals;  
• improving energy efficiency while at same time reducing the energy 
costs;  
• equal treatment of the energy political goal triangle - security of 
power supply, cost effectiveness and environmental compatibility. 
With the striving towards ecological goals and resources sustainability, the 
DER are becoming more and more important. The usage of renewable 
energy is based on a simple principle, obtaining power from natural 
energy flows like wind, water, sunlight. Under renewable resources every 
form of energy is to be understood that has neither a fossil nor nuclear 
source; i.e. sun energy, wind energy, biomass, geological heat, tide 
energy, water energy. In the following some examples of today’s usage of 
DER in Germany [27,28] are given:  
• The photovoltaic market is currently only for some applications up to 
5-10 MW because of the high costs, 
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• The micro turbines implemented by the small water power plants 
and the fuel cells implemented by the combined heat and power 
plants, are maybe not yet economically acceptable but, they do 
represent themselves with a high growth rate. 
• The very popular and economically efficient wind energy usage in 
the Onshore- and Offshore-parks has already reached the value of 
16 GW. 
• The fuel cells furthermore have been seen as a big part of the future 
energy mix, as well as in the automotive industry. 
The reasons for the above-described development of the DER technologies 
are: the implementation of micro turbines (mostly used by DER) with high 
efficiency (85%), low emissions (< 15 ppm NOx and CO2), flexibility in 
fuel usage: oil, diesel, gas, biogas, methanol, hydrogen; small 
maintenance costs (power electronic devices (inverter) and high speed 
motor), and remote control for power generation is possible [29]. 
Typical implementation can be seen in commercial/manufacturing 
industry, hospitals, private houses, shopping centres, etc. The micro 
turbines will be implemented in the medium (MV) and low voltage (LV) 
networks via inverters. For example, the fuel cells can be implemented in 
private houses and similar facilities as a substitution for gas heating. The 
installed power is between 5 kW and 250 kW.  
In Europe about 14% of the total energy generation is provided by DER 
(from them 3,2% from water power plants and 4% wind energy). The EU–
goals for the year 2020 are to reach DER generation of about 22% of the 
total energy generation, with 12,5% water power and 8% wind energy 
[28]. 
In this chapter in section 4.2 the theoretical analyses of the connection of 
DER on the distribution network are presented. In section 4.3 the 
modelling of DER for protection coordination tasks are given.  
 
4.2 Connection of DER to the network 
 
The first idea of decentralised energy generation and consumption 
originated from Thomas Edison, as he in 1882 completed one block Heat-
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Power station. The idea was the realisation of one area supplied from 
micro power stations. Today, more than 120 years later, this unique idea 
is becoming more and more present in the electricity networks. One of the 
reasons lies in the liberalisation of the energy markets. The idea of the 
liberalisation brought lots of small, local power plants to the energy 
market which characterise themselves with low investment costs in 
comparison to the big coal and nuclear power plants. These small power 
plants have the possibility of offering cheaper energy to the customers 
compared to the conventional power generation, mostly because of the 
smaller power transmission costs [30]. Also these small power companies 
are closer to the energy customers and have the possibility to offer a 
better service, which is one of the most important things in the 
competitive energy market. One other reason for growth of the 
implementation of DER on the network lies in the customer demand of a 
sustainable continues energy supply. And the third reason is the 
governmental support of DER in connection with the clean environment. 
With these reasons slowly, but surely, the energy generation, 
transmission and distribution system is moving towards a power system 
with lower power losses realised with small energy units connected to the 
power transmission and distribution system, instead of the traditional and 
conventional energy cycle [31]. 
But, it must be seen that this actually means that the DER are and can 
only be an addition to the conventional energy generation. They are 
implemented on the MV or LV level, close to the customers, with a size 
between 1 MW and 50 MW. The implementation of DER in the network 
needs an implementation of a special control centre that regulates, 
controls and supervises the load management, energy flow management 
and voltage control, since most of the DER do not contribute to the 
voltage and frequency control. This system has to fulfil the functions of 
maintenance, protection and supervision of the whole power system. Also 
the functionality of the „micro network“ realised with DER must be 
coordinated and optimised in the local control centre. This local control 
centre can also be connected to an energy market centre for sale and 
purchase of energy. 
The design of the connection of the DER to the network is to be made 
according to the requirements of the existing power system. With the 
implementation of DER, a new situation concerning the power system 
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operation, for example the load flow can be observed. Concerning the load 
flow, the connecting line between the power system and DER transforms 
itself in a bi-directional power link concerning the ratio of energy 
generation and energy demand.  
Due to the way the DER are connected in the network, it may be possible 
that the existing network protection may cause operation of the circuit 
breakers in the network. For example, this might be the case when the 
tripping parameters of the implemented over-current, or distance 
protection are set without direction criteria. Similar function can also be 
possible by the protection devices that function according to the criteria 
voltage. On the one hand, the protection devices that function according 
to the principle of over voltage may give a tripping command to the circuit 
breaker when the injected power of the DER is higher than the power 
demand of the connected energy consumers. On the other hand, the 
protection devices that function according to the criteria under voltage 
may give a tripping command when the DER are disconnected from the 
network. 
As protection units in networks with DER the following protection devices 
that use the operational principle current and/or voltage are implemented: 
time graded over-current, voltage-restrained over-current, instantaneous 
or time graded earth fault, neutral voltage displacement, differential 
protection and reverse power. For the generator: over-speed, under 
voltage, vibration detection (protection from mechanical failure together 
with devices that detect winding, bearing or over temperature). 
In case of fault in the main network (islanding operation of DER), or when 
the network frequency or the network voltage find themselves outside the 
allowed ranges, some DER are supposed to be disconnected. This is a 
result of the missing control systems for voltage and frequency stability of 
the network, by islanding operation of DER. These DER are also not to be 
re-connected to the network until the fault in the network is cleared. This 
sets the requirement of a good parameterised network protection and 
auto re-closure.  
Some problems according to the selectivity of the network protection are 
discussed in the following two examples. In Fig. 4.1a the connection 
between the DER and the network (EES) is realised with one line. A fault 
inside the protection zone of the protection devices on this line - F1 must 
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be cleared very fast, because in this case, the DER is disconnected from 
the network and a fault outside the protective zone - F2 should not disable 
the connection between DER and the power system. As criteria for the 
settings of the protection device in the example network, the voltage and 
current measurements under different network situations should be taken 
at a few nodes. 
 
  
Fig. 4.1a: Connecting DER on one side of a network 
 
In the presented example only the protection devices numbered with 1, 2, 
3 and 4 are taken into consideration during the analysis. In the case of 
fault F1 the protection devices 2 and 3 should immediately clear the fault 
and with that the power system and DER are divided. In the case of fault 
F2 the protection device 2 must wait for the protection device 4 to clear 
the fault F2. A communication channel between the protection devices 2 
and 3 is necessary for sending a blocking command or time delay to the 
device 2 in the case of fault F2.  
With regard to the settings of protection devices, a distinction needs to be 
made between the maximum and the minimum value of the short circuit 
current. The minimum value occurs when the main power supply is 
disconnected from the network and the fault is fed only from DER. The 
problem that may occur in this situation is when the highest operational 
current has a higher value than the minimum short circuit current coming 
from DER. With the time gradation of the over-current protection the 
tripping command can be delayed and with that the impedance of the 
generator will become bigger e.g. from the value of sub transient into the 
DER 
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1
2 3 4
EES  
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BB1 BB2 
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value of transient operation. The generator current will change itself in the 
same sense and will be used as tripping criteria. With the time delay the 
network stability can be questionable, because the generators may be 
brought into a swinging state. The power line, if it is a few kilometres 
long, can be protected with a differential protection. For longer lines the 
investments for the pilot wires play a role in the decision-making. 
In the case of energy supply from multiple sides (Fig. 4.1b) the problems 
for correct settings of the protection devices increase. The settings of the 
protection device 1 have to be made very carefully considering all possible 
network stages. In the network there are different generators with 
different power in feed, connected in parallel. 
 
 
Fig. 4.1b: Multiple power supply and DER 
 
The line between the protection systems 1 and 2, before the connection of 
DER to the network can be realised as directional over-current protection, 
which is typical for double-sided in feed. With the implementation of DER 
to the network a so called T-connection has been accomplished in the 
network. In this situation, in the case of a fault in the network, the 
implemented protection is not enough. A possible way to protect the lines 
in this case is with a protection using the criteria of impedance for each 
protection system with forward and backward fault location option with a 
precise definition of the protection zones or by multi terminal differential 
protection. 
2 3 4
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In the following some characteristics of two types of networks are listed 
[39]: 
Meshed networks: 
• high short circuit capacity; 
• stable voltage in the network at all nodes; 
• insensitive to load change; 
• high security and redundancy. 
On these networks DER can be implemented as long as the short circuit 
capacity doesn’t confront any dimensioning criteria of the used equipment. 
The problems which can occur are the settings of the protection devices. 
Radial networks: 
• low short circuit capacity; 
• unstable voltage if a fault in the network occurs; 
• very sensitive to load change; 
• low security and redundancy. 
The implementation of DER on these networks will influence the network 
state greatly. Easy realisation of the settings of the network protection is 
possible by using only time gradation over-current protection. 
The influence of the implementation of DER on the network can be 
summarised as follows: 
• When the total generated power from DER is smaller than the 
connected load, then the needed power from the power system is 
smaller and with that the transmission costs, transmission losses 
and the voltage drop on the transmission lines will be smaller. The 
voltage on the user side is more stable than without DER on the 
network. 
• When the total generated power from DER is equal to the connected 
load, then the transmission costs, transmission losses and the 
voltage drop on the transmission lines are minimal. 
• When the total generated power from DER is higher than the 
connected load, then it has to be checked if the dimensioning 
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criteria are fulfilled, if not, then the energy injection from DER must 
be limited. 
One meshed network with the opening of the circuit breakers can be 
operate as a radial network. This procedure can be necessary when the 
short circuit capacity after the implementation of DER on the network over 
reaches the dimensioning frames of the network elements. With this 
action the short circuit capacity will become smaller at all nodes in the 
network and this also provides the possibility for better selectivity of the 
protection devices. 
 
The problem of cost saving 
The liberalisation of the electricity market has clearly brought an increased 
pressure on the power system management to reduce the cost of energy 
generation, transmission and distribution. All utilities from the area of 
power systems in liberalised market must achieve a reasonable profit in 
order to stay in the market [29]. This means setting targets with cost 
saving goals in areas like human resource costs, maintenance costs, and 
plant investment. The human resource costs are between 30 and 60% of 
the total costs of a distribution power system [38]. With this high 
percentage of cost this area deserves to be paid special attention. The 
determination of the maintenance requirements depends mostly on the 
installed technology and is based mainly upon the company’s established 
strategies. These strategies follow the company traditions and the results 
of the long years of operational experience. The operational experience 
contains the knowledge of the fault events, inspection results, etc, in the 
utility’s network. The reduction of the costs in the area of maintenance, as 
well as the use of new digital technology, can be seen in synergy effect. 
Namely, as an exchange of experience between the personnel of different 
utilities. 
Due to the stagnating demand for electrical energy in the highly 
developed countries, capacity increases or power system structural 
changes are only necessary on a point by point basis and by the changing 
requirements of the connected customers. The situation of energy demand 
in the developing countries is completely different e.g. China. Taking the 
limited energy resources e.g. coal, oil, gas, into account, the dependability 
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of DER is becoming important. The implementation of DER in the power 
system will bring some changes connected also with benefits and costs for 
the utilities and customers. Some of the problems that might occur at 
sight are more complex power system protection schemes, connected with 
that higher costs. But, the implementation of the new concepts and 
products will take place over the next two decades, which corresponds to 
the historical range of the technology and products that exist today in the 
distribution power system [38]. 
 
The problem of islanding 
Disconnecting the main power supply from the network creates island 
network supplied only by DER [32]. This effect, in a sense of security in 
the power supply, might be allowed. But, it brings also problems with it, 
for example:  
• safety of devices and people; 
• control, communication and coordination of the functions of the 
DERs for the island; 
• not all DER are able to feed islands with free frequency. 
Concerning the control, for example, the voltage can no longer be 
controlled from the main power supply and EES, although the EES is still 
obligated to fulfil this service to the energy customers [33]. The protection 
devices in the constructed island are not set for this state of the network, 
being parameterised for the requirements set by the main power supply. 
Further, the island network might not be earthed properly. In a 
competitive energy market no electricity supply might be very expensive 
for the energy sellers. In this case, a solution for this problem must be 
found, since critical situations can occur if a part of the utility network is 
islanded and an integrated DER unit is connected. This situation is 
commonly referred to as Loss of Mains (LOM) or Loss of Grid (LOG). When 
LOM occurs, neither the voltage nor the frequency are controlled by the 
utility supply. Normally, islanding is the consequence of a fault in the 
network. If an embedded generator continues its operation after the utility 
supply was disconnected, the fault may not be cleared since the arc is still 
charged. Small embedded generators (or grid interfaces respectively) are 
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often not equipped with voltage control, therefore the voltage magnitude 
of an islanded network is not kept between desired limits, and undefined 
voltage magnitudes may occur during island operation. Another result of 
missing control might be frequency instability. Since real systems are 
never balanced exactly, the frequency will change due to active power 
unbalance. Uncontrolled frequency represents a high risk for machines 
and drives. 
Since arc faults normally clear after a short interruption of the supply, 
automatic (instantaneous) reclosure is a common relay feature. With a 
continuously operating generator in the network, two problems may arise 
when the utility network is automatically reconnected after a short 
interruption. The fault is not cleared since the arc is fed from the DER 
unit, therefore instantaneous reclosure may not succeed. In the islanded 
part of the grid, the frequency may have changed due to active power 
unbalance. Even if there is active power control, the island will not run 
synchronously with the utility system. Reclosing the switch would couple 
two asynchronously operating systems. 
Extended dead time has to be regarded between the separation of the 
DER unit and the reconnection of the utility supply to make fault clearing 
possible. Common off-time settings of auto reclosure relays are between 
100 ms and 1000 ms. With DER in the network, the total off-time has to 
be prolonged. A reclosure interval of 1 s or more for distribution feeders 
with embedded generators. 
LOM and automatic reclosure are some of the most challenging issues of 
DER protection and therefore a lot of research has been done in that area. 
The only solution to this problem seems to be disconnecting the DER unit 
as soon as LOM occurred. Thus it is necessary to detect islands fast and 
reliably.  
If a DER unit is connected via a grounded delta-wye transformer, earth 
faults on the utility line will cause ground currents in both directions, from 
the fault to the utility transformer as well as to the DER transformer. This 
is normaly not considered in the distribution system ground fault 
coordination. Whenever the utility earth connection is lost, the whole 
system gets ungrounded. 
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Current Practice - Island Detection 
To prevent island operation, the protection system has to detect islands 
quickly and reliably. This is the task of loss of mains protection. The 
methodes for island detection are divided into passive and active 
methods. Some of them will be outlined in the following sections. 
1) Passive Methods 
These methods detect loss of mains by passively measuring or monitoring 
the system state. 
• Under-/Overvoltage 
A clear indication of lost utility supply is very low voltage. If there are 
uncontrolled generators in the network, the voltage can also rise (for 
example due to resonance) and exceed the upper limit. Therefore, under- 
and overvoltage relays are a simple islanding protection method. In larger 
islands the voltage collapse will take some time, therefore this kind of 
LOM protection is often too slow. 
• Under-/Overfrequency 
Real systems are never balanced exactly. After LOM happened, the 
frequency in the island changes. Hence frequency out of limits can 
indicate island operation. The frequency does not change instantaneously 
but continuously, thus frequency relaying is a rather slow method. 
• Voltage Vector Shift  
This is also referred to as phase displacement or phase jump method.  
• Rate of Change of Voltage 
Usually voltage changes are slow in large interconnected power systems. 
If a distribution system gets separated, a rate of change of voltage occurs 
that is significantly higher than during normal operation. Therefore rate of 
change of voltage can be used to detect island operation. A major 
handicap of this method is that it is sensitive to network disturbances 
other than LOM. 
• Rate of Change of Frequency  
The frequency in an island will change rapidly due to active power 
unbalance. The corresponding frequency slope can be used to detect loss 
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of mains. Whenever df/dt exceeds a certain limit, relays are tripped. 
Typical pickup values are set in a range of 0.1 to 1.0 Hz/s, the operating 
time is between 0.2 and 0.5 s.  
• Rate of Change of Power and Power Factor 
The instantaneous power is derived from the generator voltages and 
currents and then the rate of change of power is used in a limiting 
function that prohibits mal-function due to system disturbances.  
 
2) Active Methods 
Beside passive measurements and monitoring, there are active methods 
of LOM detection where the protection system is actively interacting with 
the power system in order to get an indication for island operation. 
• Reactive Error Export 
The generator is controlled on a certain reactive power output. Whenever 
islanding occurs, it is assumed that it is not possible to deliver the 
specified amount of reactive power to the local grid since there is no 
corresponding load. This reactive export error is taken as an indicator for 
LOM. 
• Fault Level Monitoring 
The fault level in a certain point of the grid can be measured using a 
point-on-wave switched thyristor. The valve is triggered close to the 
voltage zero crossing and the current through a shunt inductor is 
measured. The system impedance and the fault level can be quickly 
calculated (every half cycle) with the disadvantage of slightly changed 
voltage shape near the zero crossover. 
• System Impedance Monitoring 
This method detects LOM by actively monitoring the system impedance. A 
high frequency source (a few volts at a frequency of a few kHz) is 
connected via a coupling capacitor at the interconnection point. 
• Frequency Shift 
Inverter-interfaced DER can be protected against LOM using frequency 
shift methods. The output current of the inverter is controlled to a 
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frequency which is slightly different to the nominal frequency of the 
system. This is done by varying the power factor during a cycle and re-
synchronization at the begin of a new cycle. Under normal conditions, the 
terminal frequency is dictated by the powerful bulk supply. If the mains 
supply is lost, frequency will drift until a certain shutdown level is exceed. 
• Voltage Pulse Perturbation and Correlation 
Two methods of islanding detection for inverter-connected DER are 
presented that use a perturbation signal of the output voltage. For the 
first method, the inverter output is perturbed with a square pulse. This 
square pulse appears in both the inner voltage of the source and the 
voltage at interconnection point. If islanding happens, the apparent 
impedance at the generator terminal increases and therefore the 
perturbation can be measured at the point of common coupling (PCC) 
(similar to system impedance monitoring). The second method uses a 
correlation function to detect LOM. The inner voltage of the source is 
randomly perturbed and correlated with the voltage change at the 
interconnection point. During normal operation, the apparent impedance 
is low and the voltage waveform at the interconnection point will not 
reflect the perturbation signal. After islanding the modulation signal will 
appear in both the inner voltage and the voltage at the interconnection 
point what results in a strong correlation. 
• Interconnect vs. Generator Protection 
Protection concerns both the distribution grid as well as the distributed 
generator itself. Therefore protection schemes have to be implemented on 
both sides of the PCC. The whole protection system is split into two parts: 
interconnect protection and generator protection. The interconnect 
protection protects the grid from the DER unit, i.e. it provides the 
protection on the grid-side for parallel operation of the DER and the grid. 
The requirements for this part are normally established by the utility. The 
generator protection is installed at the generator-side of the PCC and 
protects the DER from internal faults and abnormal operating conditions. 
Usually, the utility is not responsible for this kind of protection. 
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Examples of State-of-the-Art Relays 
A number of companies are offering generator protection and control 
systems. Four examples of generator protection devices are present on 
the market [97]: integrated generator protection; loss of mains relay; 
integrated genset control device and general electric universal 
interconnection device (see Fig. 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2: Typical multifunction interconnect relay [97] 
 
 
 32 
Table 1: Explanation of relay numbers 
 
Number Application 
21 Distance 
25 Synchronizing 
27 Undervoltage 
27N neutral undervoltage 
32 directional power 
40 loss of excitation 
46 neg. seq. current 
47 neg. seq. voltage 
50 instantaneous overcurrent 
50N neutral instantaneous overcurrent 
51N neutral time overcurrent 
51V voltage-restrained overcurrent 
59 Overvoltage 
59I instantaneous overvoltage 
59N neutral overvoltage 
60FL voltage transformer fuse failure 
67 directional overcurrent 
79 Reclosing 
81 frequency (under and over) 
81R rate of change of frequency 
87 Differential 
LOM loss of mains 
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4.3 Modelling of DER for protection coordination tasks 
 
The modeling of DER in the time internal of 0<t<100 ms is interesting for 
testing the settings of the network protection. 
 
4.3.1 Fuel cells modelling 
 
Basically for the implementation of fuel cells (FC) in the technology of 
combined heat power production (CHP) in low temperature ranges the 
polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) fuel cell is of interest. The electrical 
power in this temperature range can be between 1 kW and 1 MW. Bigger 
power plant units can be realised by coupling a few modules together. The 
FC is connected to the network via inverter, as presented in Fig. 4.3. On 
the output terminals of the FC, theoretically about 80% of the input 
energy in a form of electrical power can be gained and the remaining 20% 
is absorbed by the surrounding environment. Practically about 30-50% of 
the input energy can be gained in a form of electrical energy [86]. The 
PEM FC system contains the following components:  
• reformer (for preparation of the fuel); 
• FC (for electro chemical energy transformation); 
• inverter (for electrical energy transformation); 
•  periphery devices: humidifier, circulation pump, reformer 
compressor and exhaust heat exchanger. 
 
  
Fig. 4.3: Connection of the FC to the distribution network 
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For network protection purposes, no precise physical model of the PEM FC 
is needed, because its time constants are much higher that the network 
time constants in case of a fault as well as than time set for response of 
the network protection duration of 0<t<100 ms. 
 
 
Fig. 4.3a: Connection schema of the FC to the distribution network 
 
In this case the model of the PEM FC will mostly depend on the 
characteristics of the inverter through which the PEM FC is connected to 
the network. The inverter can be treated as a voltage controlled current 
source. In case of a fault in the network, the inverter controls will act 
within 10-15 milli seconds to protect in inverter electronics [99]. This 
means that the output current of the PEM FC is limited (see Fig. 4.3a).  
 
4.3.2 Photovoltaic modelling 
 
The photovoltaic units (PV) with the help of solar cells convert the sun 
light directly into electrical energy. This gained energy can by injected to 
the network via inverter. The electrical power of the PV can be easily 
scaled in the area of 100 Wp up to some MWp. The solar generator is 
Network 
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comprised of a few solar modules that are usually serially connected solar 
cells. The goal is here the voltage gradation. 
The PV units also are connected to the network via an inverter (see Fig. 
4.4). The solar generator together with the inverter are ready to inject 
electrical power into the network as soon as the solar generator has 
produced more energy than the losses of the inverter. The internal 
inverter also has the function of Maximal–Power–Point–Tracking, in order 
to optimally use the sun light. This function always sets the solar modules 
to operate in the maximum power point. 
 
 
Fig. 4.4: Connection of the PV to the distribution network 
 
Because of the very high time constants of the solar generator the PV 
units are modelled as voltage controlled current source. 
 
4.3.3 Electrical energy storage devices modelling 
 
The necessity of energy storage is becoming more important with regard 
to the following: constantly raising basic load in the networks, high energy 
costs during maximum load period, etc. Concerning the liberalisation of 
the energy markets and the principle of maximising the profit, the 
Network 
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mentioned problems are getting more important. The energy storage 
devices (ESD) once connected to the network, are providing the following 
services: balance of the maximal energy need, frequency stability, load 
balancing, and ready-to-use stored energy during blackouts. These 
characteristics bring advantages both to the energy producers and energy 
users. This also provides a possibility to reduce the energy transmission 
costs by energy losses. Nowadays the most used ESD is the Plumb-Acid-
Accumulator. These devices are mostly used because of their price and 
their very good technical characteristics due to recent technology 
development. The ESD are also connected to the network via an inverter 
(Fig. 4.5). The modelling of EDS will be the same as the FC and PV.  
 
 
Fig. 4.5: Connection of energy storage devices to the network (EES) 
 
4.3.4 Wind power plants modelling 
 
There are several possibilities for connecting wind power to the network 
depending of their construction and the place of connection to the 
network, refer to [34-37]. In the MV networks, usually the wind power 
plants are connected via an inverter. The connection to the network via 
inverter sets the modelling characteristics for this type of DER as well (Fig. 
4.6). This means that the same scheme (see Fig. 4.4) as for the PV unit 
can be used for modelling purposes [14].  
The wind power plants can also be connected directly to the network (see 
Fig. 4.7) or via a double feed induction generator (DFIG) (see Fig. 4.8). 
The fault injection from DFIG (fault duration 350 ms) are given in Fig. 4.9 
and Fig. 4.10. In this case the network calculations should be done as in 
networks with multiple in-feeds [37]. 
DC EES 
AC 
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Fig. 4.6: Connecting a wind power plant to the network (EES) via inverter 
 
 
Fig. 4.7: Direct connection of a wind power plant to the network (EES) 
 
 
Fig. 4.8: Connection of a wind power plant to the network via DFIG 
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Fig. 4.9: Fault current calculation from DFIG with 15% residual voltage at PCC 
(active power, reactive power, fault current, voltage) 
 
 
Fig. 4.10: Fault current calculation from DFIG with 50% residual voltage at PCC 
(active power, reactive power, fault current, voltage) 
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5. The influence of a high amount of harmonics on 
different types of protection devices 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The connection of DER to the distribution systems can lead to some 
problems concerning power quality [13]. Furthermore, the grading 
implementation of power electronic devices in the interfaces of DER and 
non-linear and non-balanced loads on the distribution system is expected 
to lead to a higher level of harmonics. Research on the behaviour of the 
protective relays in the new electrical environment requires knowledge, 
not only from the field of protection technique, but also from the following 
engineering disciplines: power quality, signal processing and computing, 
system state estimation, intelligent systems, etc. The new environment 
generates disturbances in voltage and current which do not appear due to 
a fault in the protected zone [14]. These disturbances may influence the 
calculations of the implemented algorithm inside the protection system 
and lead to an incorrect tripping command to the circuit breaker. This 
phenomenon has consequences on the threshold setting of the protection 
systems and their testing [15].  
The detection and classification of the faults on a three-phase power 
distribution line (for example over-current, distance, under/over voltage, 
and differential) have been in practice for over 50 years. The theory of 
calculation of distance to fault using measured data from the three phases 
voltages and currents using measuring transformers has witnessed 
changes during this period of time, mostly influenced by signal processing, 
data evaluation and PC capabilities. Consequently, nowadays a more 
dependable and secure network protection principle with a more reliable 
principle for classifying the faults exists [20]. Some of the ways available 
today for calculating the distance to fault include:  
• steady state algorithms;  
• algorithms based on the differential equation of the first or second 
order written for the power line;  
• filter based algorithms; 
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• algorithms using the method of fuzzy logic, neuronal networks 
approach and parametric estimation have managed to improve 
some of the standard function used in the protection of power 
distribution lines like speed, data processing and evaluation. 
For simulating some types of protection systems the standard university 
tool of MATLAB-SIMULINK with SimPower System-Block Set has been 
used. Models of a few mentioned types of distance protection algorithms 
for calculating the distance to fault have been made. In simulations the 
sensitivity of different distance protection algorithms on harmonics has 
been investigated and the results of the investigation are discussed in this 
chapter. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2.1 presents the 
group of algorithms based on the steady state algorithms, section 5.2.2 
the group of algorithms based on differential equations of the first order 
(DEFO) written for the voltage of the observed power distribution line and 
section 5.2.3 the group of algorithms based on differential equations of 
the second order (DESO) written for the voltage of the observed power 
distribution line. Section 5.2.4 provides the description of two filter-based 
algorithms. This section also provides a comparison of the results of their 
implementation on a test network. The theory and implementation of an 
algorithm based on differential equation and supported with the method of 
parametric estimation is presented in Section 5.2.5. In Section 5.2.6, the 
realisation of a technique of harmonic activated neuronal network and its 
application is presented. Section 5.3 gives some practical results, made on 
a real protection device in a laboratory, considering the topic of harmonic 
influence. In Section 5.4 the modelling and testing of a differential 
protection algorithm is presented. The Conclusion summarizes the testing 
results of the presented algorithms realised in MATLAB and the practical 
results made on real protection devices. 
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5.2 Modelling distance protection in MATLAB.  
5.2.1 General information about the investigation 
 
For the modelling of distance protection in MATLAB–SIMULINK, the 
hardware and software elements of the digital relay are represented by 
corresponding blocks from the SimPower System-Block Set Library. The 
number of blocks is set to minimum with the demand of high flexibility of 
the model and high correspondents to the modelled digital protection. 
Implemented basic hardware and software components of a digital 
protection in the MATLAB - library are: ports for data acquisition, digital 
filters, distance algorithms and a few tripping characteristics. Libraries are 
made also for current and voltage transformer models. This enables the 
user to freely design digital relays and network elements by selecting and 
joining elements from these libraries. This also provides a very good 
opportunity for the user to learn the different digital protection systems 
constructions and investigate their behaviour in the different conditions as 
well as in different configurations of the network [19]. 
The input signals of the protection terminals are not ideal due to the non-
linearities of the integrated power electronics in the system elements. To 
test the behaviour of the protection system, a simple test–network 
presented in Fig. 5.1 is used. A wind power generator is connected to the 
network through a 6-pulse inverter and the load via 12-pulse inverter. 
The investigations do not take into account a fault on the distribution line, 
but injection of harmonics according (5.1) are taken into account.  
( )
1,2,3....nυ
1,pυuCk order
=
±⋅=          (5.1) 
where Ck is the order of harmonics. If p = 6, the generated harmonics 
and their maximum allowed amounts are given in Table 5.1. 
From (5.1) it can be calculated that the injected harmonics from a 12-
pulse inverter are from the 11th, 13th, 23th, 25th … order. From Table 5.1 it 
can be observed that a 12-pulse inverter injects a lower amount of 
harmonics into the power system.  
In order to investigate the behaviour of every algorithm by non-ideal input 
signals the first tests of the algorithms are carried out for one phase. 
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Table 5.1: Maximum allowed amount of harmonics by a 6 – pulse inverter 
according to IEC 61000 – 3 – 2. 
 
Harmonics 
order 
Harmonic current/ 
Nominal current 
5 0,2025 
7 0,1025 
11 0,08 
13 0,06 
17 0,05 
19 0,05 
23 0,03 
25 0,03 
 
 
Fig. 5.1: Test-network for protection algorithms 
 
As non-ideal input signals on the protection terminals the maximum 
values given in Table 5.1 are used. The standard output values of voltage 
transformer 100V and current transformer 1A are used. The protected line 
has the following parameters: 
• nominal cross section area Al/Fe 95/15 mm2; 
• voltage level 10 kV; 
• conductor design, wire number x diameter 19 x 2.5; 
• conductor diameter 12.5 mm; 
• resistance per km R’= 0.214Ω /km; 
• reactance per km X’ = 0.11Ω /km; 
• line length L = 20 km. 
G1
S1
Transformer
S2
Line 2
S3
LoadProtection
CB1
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5.2.2 Steady-state algorithms  
 
To calculate the distance to fault on the protected power distribution line, 
this group of algorithms uses the steady-state equations of the input 
signals treating them as solid sinusoidal voltages and currents. With a 
small sampling rate (8-12 samples per period) of the voltages and the 
currents, the resistance R (Ohm) and the reactance X (Ohm) is calculated. 
With the values of the line parameters, the distance to fault can be easily 
calculated. The algorithms of: Gilbert/Shovlin, Mann/Morrison, 
Gilcrest/Rockefeller and the T2-Method of Lobos belong to this group 
[16,18]. The behaviour of all of these algorithms was investigated. As an 
example, the response of the steady-state algorithms, the algorithm of 
Gilbert/Shovlin (Fig. 5.2) and the algorithm of Gilcrest/Rockefeller (Fig. 
5.3) will be given in the following Section.  
The Gilbert/Shovlin algorithm needs three sampling data of voltage and 
current and calculates the impedance as follows:  
( )
31
2
2
311322
iii
iuiu0.5iuR ⋅−
⋅+⋅⋅−⋅=        (5.2) 
 
sinΔ
iii
iuiuX
31
2
2
2332 ⋅⋅−
⋅−⋅=         (5.3) 
where ωΔtΔ = .  
 
Fig. 5.2: Response of the Gilbert/Shovlin algorithm 
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The response of this algorithm, when the input signals of voltage and 
current contain harmonics as given in Table 5.1 is shown on Fig. 5.2.  
The Gilcrest/Rockefeller algorithm needs also three sampling data of 
voltage and current and calculates the impedance as follows:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1232132
123
2
13
2
i2ii4iiΔ
u2uu4uuΔabs(Z) +−⋅+−⋅
+−⋅+−⋅=      (5.4) 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+−
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅+−
−=
2
Δ
i2ii
iiarctan
2
Δ
u2uu
uuarctan
123
13
123
13ϕ     (5.5) 
ϕ
ϕ
sinabs(Z)X
cosabs(Z)R
⋅=
⋅=
         (5.6) 
 
Fig. 5.3: Response of the Gilcrest/Rockefeller algorithm 
 
The results of this group of algorithms are given in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2: Characteristics of the steady-state algorithms 
 
Input signals Gilbert/ 
Shovlin 
T2-Methode 
Lobos 
Mann/ 
Morrison 
Gilbert/ 
Rockefeller 
Sinusoidal ++ ++ + + 
Harmonics -- -- -- -- 
Sampling rate 8 8 12 12 
Data window (ms) 7.5 5 3.33 5 
Symbol meanings: (++) insensitive, (+) relatively insensitive, (0) just acceptable, (-) sensitive, 
systematic follows [16] 
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It can be seen, that the algorithms from this group are extremely 
sensitive to harmonic influence. The estimation of the reactance and the 
resistance of the power distribution line is not stable and with that the 
command for relay - tripping is incorrect. The reasons for this lay in the 
small number of sampling data and the small data window. 
These algorithms should not be used for calculation of the fault distance 
when signal disturbances caused by dispersed energy resources and non-
linear loads are present in the network. 
 
5.2.3 Algorithms based on DEFO 
 
In the case of lumped distribution line parameters when the capacitances 
of the line are neglected the line differential equation for the investigated 
power distribution line can be written as: 
dt
di(t)Li(t)Ru +⋅=          (5.7) 
In this way, the transient signals from the network can be taken into 
consideration. Equation (5.7) is solved with numerical approximation 
techniques. With a few sampling data (8-24 per cycle) of the input 
voltages and currents, the line resistance R (Ohm) and Inductance L (H) 
and consequently the distance to the fault can be calculated. Using this 
principle as a basis for calculating the distance to the fault on the line, the 
following algorithms are known in the literature [16]: Ranjabar/Cory, 
Bornard/Bastide, McInnes/Morrison, and the A3- and A4-Method of Lobos. 
This group of algorithms has been tested in a test network. The results 
are given in Fig. 5.4 for the A3- Method of Lobos and characterised as just 
acceptable.  
As a second example, the algorithm of Bornard/Bastide will be shown. 
This algorithm takes into consideration the capacitances of the faulted 
line. 
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Fig. 5.4: Response of the A3- Method of Lobos 
 
 
These parameters have been taken into consideration by the value of e(t). 
With this remark the following equation can be written:  
dt
di(t)Li(t)Re(t)u(t) +⋅=+         (5.8) 
The input current is, as in the algorithm of Lobos, written as: )sin(max tIi ω=  
and with this has been taken as sinusoidal into consideration. Using 
transformation and approximation techniques, for the parameters of the 
faulted line can be written: 
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( )
Δ
ΔsinLL 0 ⋅=          (5.11) 
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ω
2
ΔtanLRR 00 ⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅+=         (5.12) 
LΔtωX ⋅⋅=           (5.13) 
The sampling rate of this algorithm is 24 values per period. The results 
are given in Fig. 5.5 for the algorithm of Bornard/Bastide and 
characterised as relatively insensitive on presence of harmonics in the 
input signals. 
The results of this group of algorithms are given in Table 5.3. 
 
Fig. 5.5: Response of the Bornard Bastide algorithm 
 
Table 5.3: Characteristics of the algorithms solving line differential equation 
first order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Symbol meanings: (++) insensitive, (+) relatively insensitive, (0) just acceptable, (-) sensitive, 
systematic follows [16] 
 
Input signals A3- 
Lobos 
A4- Lobos Bornard/ 
Bastide 
McInnes/ 
Morrison 
Sinusoidal ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Harmonics 0 - + 0 
Sampling rate 8 8 24 20 
Data window 
(ms) 
7.5 10 15 11 
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5.2.4 Algorithms based on DESO 
 
This group of algorithms is presented with the algorithm from Smolinski, 
an algorithm that takes the capacitances of the power distribution line into 
consideration (π -model of power distribution line). In this way Eq. 5.14 
presents the voltage at the measurement terminals of the distance 
protection. 
2
2
dt
u(t)dCL
dt
du(t)CR
dt
di(t)Li(t)Ru(t) ⋅−⋅−+⋅=       (5.14) 
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The results are presented in Fig. 5.6 and characterised as relatively 
insensitive. 
 
Fig. 5.6 Response of the Smolinski algorithm 
 
In Table 5.4 the result of this algorithm is given. Using solid sinusoidal 
input signals this algorithm is not stable, because of the linear 
dependency of the equations system. The implementation of the Smolinski 
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algorithm as part of a complex algorithm made from a few parallel-
connected algorithms is possible. 
Table 5.4: Characteristics of the Smolinski algorithm 
 
Input signals Smolinski 
Sinusoidal -- 
Harmonics + 
Sampling rate 60 
Data window (ms) 2 
Symbol meanings: (--) very sensitive, (+) relatively insensitive, systematic follows [16] 
 
5.2.5 Algorithms using filter approach 
 
In this group of methods, the output signals from the measuring voltage 
and current transformer are filtered, sampled, digitized and sent to the 
filter algorithm. There are a few known methods of filter algorithms e.g. 
Phadke/Ibrahim, Slemon/Robertson, Sachdev/Baribeau, Carr/Jackson, the 
method using the symmetric components, which use different types of 
filters for calculating the distance to the fault [16]. In this section, the 
approach of the algorithms of Phadke/Ibrahim [6] and Slemon/Robertson 
will be briefly presented. These algorithms calculate the orthogonal 
components of the input signals voltage, given with (5.16) and (5.17):  
{ } )
n
2πk(sinu
n
2URe
1n
0k
k
⋅= ∑−
=
        (5.16) 
{ } )
n
2πk(cosu
n
2UIm
1n
0k
k
⋅= ∑−
=
        (5.17) 
and current (4.18) and (4.19): 
{} )
n
2πk(sini
n
2IRe
1n
0k
k
⋅= ∑−
=
        (5.18) 
{} )
n
2πk(cosi
n
2IIm
1n
0k
k
⋅= ∑−
=
        (5.19) 
where n is the number of sampling data for one cycle (in the test 
example, n = 20 (20 samples per signal period T = 20 ms) is used).  
Using the orthogonal components of the voltages and the currents the 
resistance R (Ohm) and the reactance X (Ohm) of the power distribution 
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line can be calculated either directly the algorithm of Phadke/Ibrahim, 
using Equations (5.20) and (5.21): 
{ } {} { } {}
{}( ) {}( )22 IImIRe
IImUImIReUReR +
⋅+⋅=        (5.20) 
{ } {} { } {}
{}( ) {}( )22 IImIRe
IImUReIReUImX +
⋅−⋅=        (5.21) 
Or using the calculation of the impedance and the phase angle as the 
algorithm of Slemon/Robertson using equations (5.22) and (5.23): 
{ } { }( ) { }( ){}( ) {}( )22
22
IImIRe
UImUReZabs +
+=        (5.22) 
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Fig. 5.7a: Response of the Phadke/Ibrahim algorithm 
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Fig. 5.7b: Response of the Phadke/Ibrahim algorithm 
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Fig. 5.8: Response of the Slemon/Robertson Algorithm 
 
It can be noticed that the resistance R and the reactance X of the power 
distribution line are correctly calculated in a time frame of t = 20 ms for 
the algorithm of Phadke/Ibrahim and in time frame of t = 28 ms for the 
algorithm of Slemon/Robertson. That is precisely the time frame of one 
data window for the algorithm of Phadke/Ibrahim [6]. The differences are 
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due to the method of calculation, realisation of the filter, the sampling 
rate and the data window. The filter algorithms typically need about 20 ms 
calculation time, as can be seen in Figs. 5.7a and 5.7b. This time can be 
shortened by up to 10 ms using different window techniques such as fast 
Fourier transformation (FFT) or implementations of the least square (LSQ) 
method, for example [20]. 
 
Table 5.5: Characteristics of the filtering-algorithms 
 
Symbol meanings: (++) insensitive, systematic follows [16] 
 
As an example, the results of fault at time t=0.03 s (Phase B to ground 
solid fault) are given in Fig. 5.9. It is evident, that the algorithm needs 20 
ms to stabilise and calculate the impedance of the three-phase line, as 
well as after the fault on the line, to calculate the new line parameters 
[19].  
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Fig. 5.9: Response of the algorithm Phadke/Ibrahim in the case of phase A to 
ground fault 
Input  
signals 
Phadke/ 
Ibrahim 
Slemon/ 
Robertson 
Carr/ 
Jackson 
Sachdev/ 
Baribeau 
Sinusoidal ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Harmonics ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Sampling rate 20 20 16 12 
Data Window(ms) 20 20 25 15 
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The tripping command is given after t = 20 ms and the distance to the 
fault is correctly measured at the first tripping zone of the distance 
protection algorithm.  
These algorithms can be used for calculating the fault distance when a 
high measurement precision is requested. 
 
5.2.6 Algorithms using parametric estimation  
 
Using the digital values of the input signals it is possible to estimate the 
distance to the fault [21]. This method is used for the algorithm of 
differential equation of first order written for the power distribution line 
[25]. In this case, the voltage on each point of the line is given by Eq. 5.7. 
The current in Eq. 5.7 can be written with the help of numerical 
approximation in Eg. 5.25: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1kibkua1ki
Δt
LR
1
Δt
L
Δt
LR
1kuki −⋅+⋅=−⋅
+
⋅+
+
=     (5.25) 
The coefficients a and b are to be estimated with the presented procedure 
and include the parameters R and X. With the help of vectors (5.26) and 
(5.27) the expected estimation error e is evaluated in equation (5.28).  
( ) [ ]1)i(ku(k)kphi −=         (5.26) 
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( ) θphii(k)ke ⋅−=          (5.28) 
NNNN θHIE ⋅−=          (5.29) 
Equation (5.27) can be solved with the help of the least square calculation 
method. The vector NI  comprises the input data of the algorithm and the 
vector NH  the regression data. In this sense the iteration procedure with 
LSQ method can be written as follows: 
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( ) e(k)h1)θ(kkθ ⋅+−=         (5.30) 
and for the next step: 
( ) e(k)1)h(kθ(k)1kθ ⋅++=+         (5.31) 
The error can be minimised with the procedure: 
( ) 1)θ(kphii(k)ke −⋅−=         (5.32) 
The results of the calculation using this algorithm are presented in Fig. 
5.10. It can be noted that this method accelerates the calculation of the 
impedance in a factor of 6, namely the results of the swinging starting up 
with this method are managed in timeframe of t = 3 ms. The reasons for 
this lay in the LSQ method of calculation. In this method, an acceleration 
procedure is also implemented. 
0 0.005 0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Time [s]
R and X
Parameter R
Parameter X
 
Fig. 5.10: Response of the algorithm using Parametric Estimation in the case of 
phase A to ground fault 
 
The acceleration procedure is given as:  
( ) [ ]1)phi(kP(k)1)(kphiλ 11)phi(kP(k)1kh T +⋅⋅++⋅+⋅=+     (5.33) 
( ) P(k)1)(kphi1)h(k
λ
1P(k)
λ
11kP T ⋅+⋅+−=+       (5.34) 
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The factor 0.9λ1 >> is the so-called forgetting factor. The forgetting factor 
enables that oldest data which have less influence on the calculation to be 
neglected and to the new data importance is given by using different 
weights. This method is faster than the filtering algorithms method.  
 
5.2.7 Algorithms using HANN 
 
The idea of using neuronal networks in protective relaying is not new. 
Various applications of neuronal networks were used in the past to 
improve some standard functions used in the protection of power 
distribution lines like e.g. speed, signal processing, data evaluation 
[17,24]. The neuronal networks have been related to fault type and 
direction classification [17,22]. In the following section, a kind of 
harmonic activated neuronal network (HANN) is going to be presented. A 
comparison between the two different approaches of training the neuronal 
networks namely, LSQ (least square) and back propagation (BP), will be 
presented. This type of neuronal network has been used for fault type 
classification. The idea of realisation of a HANN began due to the 
possibility that every non-sinusoidal signal can be written as a Fourier 
array of sinusoidal functions [23]. This function can be divided into four 
parts as follows:  
( )ϕϕϕϕ d)sin(kb)cos(ka
2
a)y(
N
1k
k
N
1k
k
0 +⋅+⋅+= ∑∑
==
     (5.35) 
The first part includes the constant component, the second and third parts 
the sinusoidal functions and the last part the approximation error. This 
function can be approximated, trained (learned) and reproduced with the 
help of HANN (Eq. 5.36).  
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  (5.36) 
where:  
[ ]T)cos(k...)cos(2)cos(1)(A TA ϕϕϕϕ =       (5.37) 
[ ]T)sin(k...)sin(2)sin()(ATB ϕϕϕϕ =       (5.38) 
[ ]TTAkTA2TA1TA0TA θ...θθθθ =        (5.39) 
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[ ]TTBkTB2TB1TB0TB θ...θθθθ =        (5.40) 
With this the parameter error can be written: 
T
A
T^
AA θθΦ −=  and TBT^BB θθΦ −=  and for the training error: 
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The training gives a result about the spectral analysis of the identification 
of the input signals, with which the process can be diagnosed and 
monitored. The training data can be obtained from measurements or 
computation of different fault scenarios in the networks. For evaluation of 
the procedure, the amplitude and the phase of the components of the 
input signals can be given as follows: 
2'
BK
2'
AKK θθA' +=           (5.42) 
and  
'
AK
'
BK
K θ
θ
arctanψ' =          (5.43) 
The training law can be written as in Eq. 5.44 and 5.45:  
)(Aeηθ'
dt
d
AA ϕ⋅⋅−=          (5.44) 
and  
)(Aeηθ'
dt
d
BB ϕ⋅⋅−= ,         (5.45) 
where the coefficient η  represents the training increment. The calculation 
of the distance to the fault is realised with the help of an additional Fourier 
filter algorithm. 
Least Square Method – LSQ Method 
This training method is used to bring the square difference between the 
sampled signal and the components of the calculated signal to a minimum 
in iteration steps M<n (Eq. 5.46). 
Minimum)))tsin(nωA)tcos(nω(A)(f(nt
M
1e 2an
1M
0n
BanAa
2 ⇒+−= ∑−
=
   (5.46) 
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This will be reached as soon as equation (5.47) has been achieved:  
0
A
e
A
e
B
2
A
2
=∂
∂=∂
∂          (5.47) 
For M<n, the results give the approximated values for the Fourier 
coefficients and for M = n, the Fourier coefficients.  
 
Back Propagation Method 
This method is based on the following equations (5.48 – 5.51): 
[ ] [ ]( ) ,2T kAθ'ky
2
1E −=          (5.48) 
where [ ]kAT'θ  is calculated from HANN.  
The differential of the error is given by (5.49): 
[ ] [ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ] [ ],kAkekAkAθ'ky
θ'
E T ⋅−=−⋅−=∂
∂       (5.49) 
where [ ] [ ] [ ]kekAθ'ky T =−        (5.50) 
presents the error by the calculation and Aeη
t
θ' ⋅⋅−=∂
∂
 
The training law with gradation principle can be written as: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]kAkeη1-kθ'kθ' ⋅⋅−=        (5.51) 
where η  is the training step.  
This method is graphically presented in Fig. 5.11.  
 
 
 0>η       0=η  
 
 
θ           θ  
 
Fig. 5.11: Definition of using different training steps 
 
 
As it can be seen from the Fig. 5.11, that the value of the training step is 
very important in this method. It means that when η  is changeable during 
E E 
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the time of the training the HANN learn faster. The comparison results of 
the two-presented methods are given in Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13.  
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Fig. 5.12: Response of the algorithm of HANN learned with LSQ method in the 
case of phase A to ground fault 
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Fig. 5.13: Response of the algorithm of HANN learned with BP method in the 
case of phase A to ground fault 
 
 59 
In the network with protecting device with HANN algorithm that is trained 
using the LSQ method a phase to ground fault at t = 12 ms has been 
simulated. In Fig. 5.12 it can be seen that this algorithm needs t = 5 ms 
to stabilize and t = 12 ms to calculate the fault. The second calculation 
approach HANN trained with BP needs over t = 20 ms to stabilize and has 
been tested with the same fault type, giving the result after t = 12 ms. As 
it can be seen in Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13 the method of LSQ gives the 
results of the calculated parameters much faster than the method of BP. 
The reasons for this lay in the method of calculation. The swinging of the 
signals has been successfully eliminated with the method of LSQ.  
Programmed in three phases the difference between the two methods of 
calculation using HANN is also evident, as shown on the next figures:  
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Fig. 5.14: Comparison of HANN BP and HANN LSQ 
 
The components of the short circuit current, i.e. the harmonic coefficients 
of the input signals, calculated with HANN are presented in Fig. 5.15.  
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
Zeit [s]
P
ar
am
et
er
w
er
te
Harmonische Koeffizienten
Gleichglied           
5-te Harmonische (sin)
5-te Harmonische (cos)
7-te Harmonische (sin)
7-te Harmonische (cos)
 
Fig. 5.15: Components of the short circuit current 
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The neuronal networks implemented with the aim of protecting a line are 
much faster then the conventional methods of line protection. However, 
these systems are able to produce good results only for those situations 
that have been explicitly considered during their design and training. 
 
5.3 Practical analyses of digital protection devices 
 
The results from the simulations have also been compared with the results 
from the practical measurements in the Institute’s laboratory. A 
simulation that works without any feedback/interaction coming from the 
protective systems or dynamic switching action is an Open Loop 
Simulation. A Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) allows the simulator to 
process real time data coming from the relay being tested and with this 
allow closed loop testing so that the relay response can modify simulation 
behaviour in real time [26, 87].  
In the laboratory at the university an open loop of tests have been made. 
Different amounts of harmonics, a multiple of the standards IEC 61000 - 3 
- 2 have been sent to the digital distance protection device (Table 5.6) 
using an OMICRON device. The tested protection contained an algorithm 
based on the DEFO with integrated filter. It has been searched for the 
point of tripping, when the signals contain a high amount of harmonics but 
do not represent a fault signal. The first results show the response of the 
protection when the input signals from current and voltage contain as 
many harmonics as the standard allows. The tripping follows when the 
amount of harmonics in the signals reaches the value of 4 times the 
standard (5th line in the Table 5.6). In this case the tested distance 
protection of the lines L1 and L2 (Phase A and Phase B) picked up and 
sent a tripping command to the circuit breaker. The signals that lead to 
false tripping are illustrated in the Figure 4.15. 
Table 5.6:The European Norms EN 61000-3-2 
Harmonic order / [%] share Norm 
(N) 
5 7 11 13 17 19 23 25 
6-p  4,2 3,5 2,4 2,1 1,4 1 1 1 
12-p  - - 2,4 2,1 - 5 1 1 
N * 2 8,4 7 4,9 4,2 2,8 2,1 2,1 2,1 
N * 3 12,6 10,5 7,4 6,3 4,2 3,1 3,1 3,1 
N * 4 16,8 14 9,8 8,4 5,6 4,2 4,2 4,2 
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Comparing the results from the simulations and the practical testing, it 
can be concluded that a high amount of harmonics in the network 
influences the proper working conditions of the digital protection device.  
 
 
Fig. 5.16: Voltage and current curves that lead to false trip command 
 
When the input signals of voltage and current contain four times more 
than the allowed harmonics, then a false trip command will be sent from 
the tested distance protection device to the circuit breaker. As it can be 
seen from Fig. 5.16 such signals are very unlikely in the power system 
[17]. The tripping time of the digital distance protection device in the 
practical analysis was less then 30 ms. 
Conclusions 
The start–up as well as the behaviour under fault conditions of the 
classical algorithms using a differential equation of first order, orthogonal 
filters, and the new methods using the technique of parametric estimation 
and harmonic activated neuronal networks were presented. A comparison 
has been made concerning the criteria of speed and selectivity. The 
method of parametric estimation implemented on an algorithm that is 
based on a differential equation of the first order, as well as the method 
using the harmonic activated networks, implemented on a filter algorithm 
offers a possibility to accelerate the calculation of the distance to fault by 
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the algorithms, the swinging period of the start up of the algorithms has 
been successfully eliminated with the LSQ method. The practical analyses 
show that when the input signals of voltage and current contain four times 
more than the allowed harmonics then a false trip command will be sent 
from the tested distance protection device to the circuit breaker.  
 
5.4 Modelling of differential protection devices 
 
In special situations e.g. important industrial customers, a power 
distribution line can also be protected using a line differential protection. 
The currents of both sides of the distribution line are used as input signals 
to the protection relay. The realised algorithm functions under the well-
known current differential method. In case of a fault in the protected 
zone, the protection should send a trip command to the circuit breaker 
and in the case of a fault outside the protected zone no command will be 
sent. Especially in systems with high short circuit power and a fault close 
to the relay but outside the protected zone, the effect of current 
transformer saturation becomes important [7]. This effect represents the 
difference in the shape between the input and the output current of the 
current transformer. The higher the difference, the smaller the 
measurement precision of the current transformers, and with that the 
higher the measuring error and the possibility of a false tripping command 
[10,11]. For this purpose models of different current transformers 
considering the parameter time-to-saturate are programmed and tested.  
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Fig. 5.17: Low - Saturation 
characteristic 
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Fig. 5.18: High - Saturation 
characteristic 
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In Fig. 5.17 and Fig. 5.18 two examples as a result of different 
ferromagnetic - material characteristics and with different magnetisation 
curves and saturation effects are presented. Comparing the two given 
characteristics (Fig. 5.17 and Fig. 5.18) the importance of this event 
should be clear. This problem can also occur in the over-current protection 
[9,12]. 
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6. Protection systems in networks with DER 
 
6.1 Introduction. Impacts of power supply systems and 
challenges of protection systems 
 
The future development of power systems depends on the growing 
demand for energy which strongly differs in different countries. Based on 
a typical life cycle of a system the important stages in the system 
development are given in Fig. 6.1. The problems connected with the 
limitations of exciting energy resources, as opposed to a continuously 
growing world population, especially in developing and emerging 
countries, play and will play even more in the future an important role 
[31]. Environmental matters, along with public acceptance of certain 
technologies which also have a strong political aspect, will likewise 
become increasingly significant factors, also in this region of the world. 
 
 
Fig. 6.1: Impacts on future power supply systems 
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The global trends of deregulation, globalisation and privatisation have had 
and still have a strong impact on the electric power industry. The 
deregulation or the liberalisation has the aim of providing cheaper electric 
energy by opening the markets. The opening of the markets and the 
national borders support the global economy. In most of the west 
European countries no home markets exist any more. Due to this fact, 
more and more companies are forced to act as and be a “Global Player”. 
The privatisation has the aim of obtaining, the best value of financial 
capital needed for providing infrastructure in the energy market, from 
private investors [31]. In this sense, the structure of the power system is 
changing in technical and in organisation fields. The continuously 
improved products and development of innovative technologies support 
these changes. The power system develops in the direction of: 
• extension of interconnected systems; 
• increased power exchange among interconnected systems; 
• transmission of large power blocks over long distances (water power 
resources, wind energy, solar energy); 
• decentralised power generation. 
Due to the liberalisation of the energy markets and as well as the 
implementation of DER in the network, the network structure has changed 
from centralised to decentralised. These changes are illustrated in Fig. 
6.2. The hierarchical line of power generation by the big coal and nuclear 
power plants, the energy transmission on long power lines and finally, the 
distribution of the energy to its users is changing in the new decentralised 
energy environment. With these network changes, the direction of power 
flow, which was clearly defined before, now changes according to the ratio 
of energy offered from DER and the power system on the higher voltage 
level and the energy demand from the network customers. The 
distribution line becomes in this sense a bi-directional power link. The 
protection systems installed in the medium voltage distribution power 
system, are often not set to manage these variable changes of direction of 
power flow. With these short analyses the need for new protection 
concepts for each system is clear. Compared with the energy generation 
from nuclear plants, gas or coal, decentralised energy generation usually 
doesn’t depend on the energy demand in a given area, but mostly on the 
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intermittent weather conditions in that area e.g. the presence of sun, 
water, wind. 
 
 
Fig. 6.2: Network structure before and after the liberalisation of the energy 
market (decentralisation of energy generation)  
 
With the implementation of DER on the network, the voltage stability 
improves and the loss of active power, mostly on the long transmission 
lines, is reduced, since the energy is generated close to the energy 
demand. But, the implementation of DER on the middle voltage level also 
brings with it the following problems that need to be solved: third party 
access in the power transmission, overload during low generation capacity 
of the embedded generators, dynamic stability after a fault occurence, 
decoupling, ability to function as an island, load rejection and voltage 
control [40]. The whole system might characterise itself as a swinging 
system in the presence of fault, because of the non-presence of 
“powerful” generators that can create a strong network. Such a network is 
also characterised by a very low short circuit power, which is definitely 
going to affect the protection system [41]. 
The network protection is usually realised with over-current (inverse, very 
inverse, with/without time gradation) on the medium voltage level and 
with fuses on the low voltage level. Realised in this way, the network 
protection is fulfilling the demands of selectivity, sensitivity and speed in 
the hierarchical network [42].  
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The protection devices implemented in the network are about to be set to 
match these changes. The concepts of protection devices before and after 
the implementation of DER will be shown in this chapter in a few examples 
of two MV networks [43].  
This chapter, in Section 6.2 gives the results of the simulations in two 
distribution test networks (with and without DER implementation). Later, 
the possible problems with the network protection concepts as well as 
solutions will be listed. In Section 6.3 the possibility of using the current 
direction criteria is illustrated, in Section 6.4 the possibility of using the 
communication technology and in Section 6.5 the idea of using signal 
injection for network protection purposes.  
 
6.2 Investigations in test networks 
6.2.1 Test networks 
A) Network I – 10 kV Network 
Network I, given in Fig. 6.3, is supplied from from the power system. The 
power delivery from the system to the network is realised with two cables 
with length app. 1 km. The network consists of eleven nodes and the 
nodes are connected by twelve cables. Each cable length is about 400 m, 
which makes representive in a network of a small part of a city. The users 
are connected to the network via 10/0.4 kV-transformers. The 
transformers are loaded low (25-40%) of nominal load. The network 
contains one ring, but can also be operated as a radial network by 
opening the circuit breaker, see Fig. 6.3. 
B) Network II – 20 kV Network 
Network II given in Fig. 6.4 is also supplied from the power system. The 
energy delivery is realised via two 110/20 kV transformers. The network 
contains around 45 loads which are connected to each other by 30 cables. 
The cables are much longer (l > 1 km) than those in network I. This 
network is intended to represent a small dispersed town or village 
network. The users are connected to the network via 20/0.4 kV 
transformers. The transformers are heavly loaded 70-80% of the nominal 
load. The network also contains loads which are directly connected to the 
network on a 20 kV voltage level. The network may contain a few rings, or 
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can also be operated as a radial network by opening the circuit breakers, 
see Fig. 6.4.  
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Fig. 6.3: Network I - 10 kV Network 
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Fig. 6.4: Network II - 20 kV Network 
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6.2.2 Network scenarios and discussion 
 
In the previous Section two networks have been presented. Network I is a 
part of a small city network and network II is a network of a small 
dispersed town or village. These distribution networks have different 
characteristics, line lengths, different transformer loads and have been 
chosen for this investigation concerning connection of DER into the power 
system, because they present typical examples from the practise.  
In the presented networks the following scenarios in terms of the 
implemented network protection are discussed: 
Scenario A: Networks with conventional resources (without DER), 
Case a) the network is operated radially, 
Case b) meshed networks. 
Scenario B: The DER contribute to the main power supply from 10-90%, 
Scenario C: The DER substitutes the main power supply. 
 
Network I, Scenario Aa 
The circuit breakers on the line presented in Fig. 6.3 are open and the 
network is operated radially. The realisation of the network protection is 
presented in Fig. 6.5. In radial networks, the selectivity of network 
protection is realised using simple over-current protection. The fault 
current level describes the effect of faults in terms of current or power. It 
gives an indication of the short circuit current or (apparent) power boost. 
The fault level in p.u. is defined as: 
thz
I 1=
          (6.1) 
where I  is the fault current related to the nominal current and zth is the 
inner impedance of the Thevenin representation of the network in p.u. 
Typical fault levels in distribution networks are in a range of 10-15 p.u., 
where 1 p.u. corresponds to the rated current [97]. This is, phase-phase 
or phase-earth faults normaly result in an overcurrent which is 
significantly higher than the operational or nominal current. The amplitude 
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of the fault current is dependent on the fault impedance, for phase-earth 
faults it is also highly dependent on the grounding. This is a very basic 
precondition for the function of (instantaneous) overcurrent protection. 
The fault current has to be distinguishable from the normal operational 
current [97]. This explains the use of over-current criteria as a protection 
principle. The coordination of the network protection starts from the 
lowest, in this case low voltage level. At this voltage level the network 
protection is usually realised with fuses. The tripping time of the fuses is 
set as lowest in the network, so that in case of a fault on the low voltage 
level the criteria of selectivity can be fulfilled. In Fig. 6.5 the installation 
point, the type and the settings of the protection devices on the middle 
voltage level are given. This network can be completely protected with the 
lowest costs. In this example, the network contains no ring (T = open 
circuit breackers on line 426) so that the protection devices do not need to 
have the directional criteria activated. The power supply lines from the 
power system are protected also with over-current protection. One of the 
cables with smaller diameter serves as a reserve, and usually is out of 
operation.  
 
Fig. 6.5: Network protection in network I, Scenario Aa 
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The problem that occurs by using this type of protection is that the 
tripping time of the protection devices implemented closer to the main 
power supply is long - in this example, because the time gradation of the 
network protection is set to 0.9 s. 
Network I, Scenario Ab 
The circuit breakers on the line presented in Fig. 6.3 are closed and the 
network is operated as meshed. The realisation of the network protection 
is presented on Fig. 6.6. Changes according to the coordination of the 
network protection, are needed only on the protection devices set to 
protect the cables involved in the ring. All of this protection devices need 
to have a set of over-current criteria including the setting of direction. In 
this way this protection devices are able to “see” from which direction the 
fault current is coming, so that they can assure a selective tripping and 
with that offer to the customers a reliable and secure power supply. The 
other protection devices already present in the network do not need any 
changes in their settings, because the changes of the value in the currents 
flowing through the cables they protect are negligible. 
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Fig. 6.6: Network protection in network 1, Scenario Ab 
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Network 1, Scenario B 
In this scenario, some DER have been implemented into the network at a 
few positions. Into the network 1, on a few positions some DER are 
implemented (see. Fig. 6.7). Their power supply amount varies between 
10 and 90 % of the main power supply according to the power demand of 
the network (Fig. 6.7). With the addition of DER to the network, it 
changes from a network with a single power supply, to a network with 
multiple power supplies. Furthermore, the following changes in the power 
flow are noticed:  
• The direction of power flow through the lines may be variable, 
according to the ratio of power generation and power demand in the 
network; 
• The values of the currents through the lines in the networks may 
vary from moment to moment according to the mentioned ratio.  
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Fig. 6.7: Implementation of DER on the network 1, Scenario B 
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In case of a fault on a line in this network, the main part of the fault 
current comes from the main power supply. As a result, the short circuit 
capacity of the network and the amplitude and the duration of the fault 
current are also set from the main power supply. Their values hardly vary 
from the values obtained in scenario Aa and Ab. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to change any settings of any of the protection devices in the 
network. 
 
Network 1, Scenario C 
When a network is separated from the main power supply and thereby 
creates an island, the network protection concept must be changed (Fig. 
6.9). The network contains multiple power suppliers, but has no longer 
the main power supply. The implemented network protection was selected 
and set when the main power supply was present in the network. As 
discussed previosly, in case of a fault on a line or a node in the network, 
but only in the cases when the main power supply is present in the 
network, the short circuit power of the network as well as the amplitude 
and the duration of the fault current are set from the main power supply. 
To fulfill the protection criteria, there has to be a powerful source 
providing a high fault current until the relays trigger.  
In the case of an island the amplitude and the duration of the fault current 
is dependent on the DER in the network. The DER are connected to the 
network via a power electronic inverter. The inverters are often equipped 
with controllers that prevent high currents. It could happen that there is 
almost no significant rise of the phase current and the fault is therefore 
not detected from the overcurrent protection system. The other problem 
are the dangerous touch voltages that may occur even if the current is 
low. Furthermore permanent faults may spread out and destroy more 
equipment [97]. 
So the injected short circuit current from DER Ik is either Ik = 1.1 In, or 
the current is limited to value Ik = 0. The duration of the short circuit 
current is limited by this element to the maximum value of 10 to 15 ms. 
This phenomena characterises the speciality of this scenario. With this, a 
new problem in the network protection is introduced. Namely, the 
amplitude of the short circuit current, as well as the duration of the short 
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circuit current are not able to reach the afore-mentioned settings of the 
protection devices in the network. Under this circumstance no tripping 
command will be sent to any of the protection devices, and the network 
will continue to operate under unallowed fault conditions. There are a few 
solutions to this problem of lack of network protection. A first possibility is 
the implementation of a new protection concept, namely the differential 
protection on each line in the network. This solution is very expensive, 
because of the need for a new type of protection device and pilot wires for 
each line for the communication between two devices protecting the same 
line. The other possible solution is using the same protection principle as 
presented in the past scenarios, graded over-current protection with 
direction, but in addition, this protection concept take into account the 
implementation of communication channels. The communication channels 
are seen only between the neighbouring substations. With this idea the 
protection devices implemented in each substation have the possibility to 
communicate and exchange data with the other protection devices 
implemented on the neighbouring substation in normal as well as in fault 
conditions.  
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Fig. 6.9: Separation of the main power supply on network 1, Scenario C 
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Network II, Scenario Aa 
The protection concept of the second example network presented in Fig. 
6.10 is very similar to the protection concept of the first example network. 
With regards to investment costs, the protection concept can also be 
realised only with graded over-current protection. When the circuit 
breakers as presented in Fig. 6.4 are opened, the network contains no 
rings and is operated radially. The settings of the protection devices is 
presented in Fig. 6.10. The problem that occurs here is that, when the 
same procedure of time grading as in example network 1 is used, is that 
the tripping time of the breakers close to the supply station will need 
approximately 2.4 s. This time is too long for of a short circuit current at 
the secondary side of the supply transformers, because of their thermal 
insulation. The two options in this case are either smaller grading times of 
200 ms (instead of 300-400 ms), or global tripping, where the selectivity 
of the protection system decreases. 
 
Network II, Scenario Ab 
The idea of protecting this network is similar to the protection concept for 
network I in scenario Ab. The circuit breakers on the line presented in Fig. 
6.4 are closed and the network is operated as meshed with a few rings. 
Changes according to the coordination of the network protection, are 
needed for the protection devices that are set to protect the cables that 
are involved in the rings. All of these protection devices need to have a 
over-current criteria which include direction. In this way these protection 
devices are able to “see” the direction from which the fault current is 
coming, so that they can assure a selective tripping and with that offer to 
the customers a reliable and secure power supply. The other protection 
devices already present in the network do not suffer any changes of their 
settings, because the changes of the value of the currents flowing through 
the cables they protect are negligible. 
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Fig. 6.10: Network protection in network II, Scenario Aa 
 
Network II, Scenario B 
Scenario B discusses the implementation of DER into network II. As 
presented in Fig. 6.11, in a few positions some DER (according to the 
natural offer) are connected to the network. The results of the simulations 
concerning load flow are similar with Network I Scenario B.  
In case of a fault on a line in this network, the main system supplies the 
fault current. As a result, the short circuit power of the network and the 
amplitude and the duration of the fault current are also set from the main 
power supply. Their values hardly vary from the values obtained in 
scenario Aa and Ab. Due to this fact, there is no need to change any 
settings of any protection device in the network. Eventually longer lines 
could be protected with distance protection devices, which as a solution 
would have the impact of higher costs. 
The most selective and expensive solution offers the differential protection 
set on both ends of each line in the network (see Fig. 6.11). 
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Fig. 6.11: Implementation of DER in network II– 20 kV network 
 
Network II, Scenario C 
When the network is separated from the main power supply and with that 
forms an island, the network protection concept must be changed (Fig. 
6.12). The network contains multiple power suppliers, but not the main 
power supply. The DER are connected to the network via a inverter, that 
sets the limits for the amplitude and the duration of the short circuit 
current. The network can be protected either via differential protection or 
by using over-current protection combined with communication channels 
between neighbouring substations for exchange of data in normal as well 
as in fault conditions.  
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Fig. 6.12: Separation of the main power supply in network II – 20 kV network 
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6.2.3 Analysis of the simulation results 
 
A few simulations of short circuit current calculation have been done in the 
two networks described previously. The simulations have also taken into 
account different amounts of DER that have been connected to the two 
networks. To test the settings of the protection devices, the following 
short circuit current simulations are discussed: 
1) Network I and network II, Scenario Aa; 
2) Network I and network II, Scenario Ab; 
3) Network I and network II, Scenario B; 
4) Network I and network II, Scenario C. 
1) In the short circuit current investigation in network I and network II, 
Scenario Aa, the short circuit current in the network was generated from 
the main power supply and has values 10 -15 times the nominal current, 
the duration of the transient period is long enough for the protection 
device to detect and localize the short circuit current. Therefore, the 
demands of the protection criteria over-current are fulfilled. The settings 
of the protection devices have also been chosen correctly in order to meet 
the selectivity criteria. So the selectivity is reached with the lowest 
investment cost for the protection system.  
2) In the short circuit current investigation in network I and network II, 
Scenario Ab, the circuit breaker is closed and a ring has been formed. The 
protection devices involved within the ring need to have a direction 
criteria in order to decide from which side the fault is coming and be 
selective.  
3) In the short circuit current investigation in network I and network II, 
Scenario B, with the connection of DER to the network, the network 
changes from a network with single supply to a network with multiple 
power suppliers. In the case of a fault in the network with DER, the 
highest amount of short circuit current flows from the main power supply. 
The short circuit power from the main power supply is 150 MVA in 
network I and 250 MVA in network II, while that from the DER is in 5-
5000 kW range. With this it is clear that the protection settings doesn’t 
have to be changed. 
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4) In the short circuit current investigation in network I and network II, 
Scenario C, there is no connection to the main power supply of the 
network and with that the network is in island operation. In this case it is 
clear that the protection concept previously presented is not suitable for 
this condition. Namely, there is no large power supply that can fulfil the 
criteria of the protection principle over-current. The power supply in the 
network in this case comes only from DER and is in 5-5000 kW range. In 
case of a fault, when there are no communication channels between the 
protection devices from neighbouring substations it is impossible for the 
protection devices to decide if the fault is in forward or reverse direction. 
This results from the protection concept principle and the settings of the 
protection devices. Namely, the two basic requirements of the over-
current and distance protection are the following:  
• the short circuit current must be higher then the maximum overload 
current in all network feeders; 
• the duration of the short circuit current must be longer than the 
delay time of the last upstream relay.  
In Scenario C these requirements are not fulfilled. The fault current is 
limited from all energy supply sides of the network. The only possibility of 
protecting this network using the conventional principles is only by using 
differential protection for each line. The problem is, of course, the higher 
costs for the additional devices and pilot wires between the protection 
devices implemented on the both ends of each line. 
Note: In the presented networks the DER connected to the investigated 
networks (network I and network II, scenario B and C) are connected via 
inverters that limit the injecting current in case of a fault in the network 
with a value of 1,1In. The wind power plants can also be connected to the 
network via DFIG. In this case the network calculations should be carried 
out as in networks with multiple in feeds. The current contribution of 
directly connected DER must be considered in case of a fault in the 
network. The network protection concept can also be realised with 
directional and non-directional over-current protection devices [44]. 
Another possibility to solve the network protection problem in the case of 
multiple in-feed can be realised with so called zone protection. With zone 
protection, the investigated distribution network is divided into several 
zones, where one zone represents all of the lines connected to one bus 
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bar. Each zone is protected separately mostly with the over-current 
protection, the Kirchoff’s law for currents and signalling technology [44].  
In the following the case of an island operation in a network with multiple 
DER in-feed is presented. Other than using a main communication and 
decentralised protection system, the other possible solution for solving the 
problem of multiple in feed is also presented. In this case the change of 
voltage and frequency can give a criteria for selective network protection. 
Over- and under voltage and frequency relays can be used in this case 
[45].  
 
Comparison with protection systems in current limited networks 
The interest in devices capable of limiting fault currents grows together 
with the increased interconnection of the network, which leads to higher 
fault currents. In order to link and establish a stronger coupling of various 
systems sections without impairing stability or short-circuit behaviour, a 
new technology using super conducting fault current limiters (HTSC-FCL) 
and electronic high-speed circuit-breakers (ESI-switch) can be 
implemented. The benefit of the use of these elements is that the stress 
experienced by all components in the system is significantly reduced and 
the design can be much more cost effective [88].  
In a substation such a unit is usually implemented in: 
• the outgoing feeders; 
• tie feeders (connecting feeders); 
• incoming feeders. 
The operational principle of a current limiter can be summarized in: 
• reducing the magnitude of the fault current; 
• switching off the fault current before reaching the peak. 
A fault current limiter can limit a fault current passing through it within 
the first half cycle. Their use allows equipment to remain in service even if 
the prospective fault current exceeds its rated peak (Fig. 6.13). The 
current is usually limited to a value of three times the nominal current. In 
Fig. 6.13 two different types of current limiters are given (characteristics 
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in blue and green). It can be noted that the fault current limiter with 
green marked characteristic (semiconductor type) limits the current within 
few milli seconds and sets it to the value zero. The fault current limiter 
with the characteristic marked with blue (super-conductor) also limits the 
fault current in few milli seconds, but sets it to the nominal current value 
for max. 50 ms.  
 
Fig. 6.13: Characteristics of fault current limiters 
 
The protection system in the medium voltage network where the current 
limiter has been implemented suffers changes. Usually these networks are 
mainly protected by protection systems based on the principle of over-
current. When the fault current is limited, the protection device sees no 
fault current and also no duration of a current higher than the nominal set 
current. Therefore, there is no need for the implemented over-current 
relay to send a tripping command to the circuit breaker. The limited or 
pass-through current is identified as the nominal current.  
There are two possible solutions for this problem of unselectivity of the 
protection devices. The first new suitable solution uses the criteria of over-
current protection, combined with the reverse interlocking as a criteria of 
line protection.  
The principle of reverse interlocking will be explained in the following 
simple example (see Fig. 6.14). If a fault on one of the feeders occurs, all 
of the protection devices shown in Fig. 6.14 pick up. However, in order to 
satisfy the criteria of selectivity, only the protection device implemented 
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on the feeder where the fault occurred is supposed to locate it and send a 
tripping command to the circuit breaker to disconnect that feeder. The 
supply of electrical energy for the other customers (connected to the other 
feeders) should not be interrupted. As a back-up protection, the 
protection device located at the main feeder is about to disconnect the 
fault, but in this case all of the customers would be without supply. 
 
Fig. 6.14: Principle of reverse interlocking 
 
With the implementation of the principle of reverse interlocking such a 
situation can be better managed. Namely, as soon as the circuit breaker 
from the feeder localises the fault present on it, it sends a blocking 
command to the main other protection devices at the other feeders. In 
case of a fault on the busbar, only the main protection device will 
disconnect the fault. If there are no other possibilities for energy supply, 
the customers will stay without power supply until this fault has been 
cleared.  
The presented solution can be also implemented in networks with high 
penetration of DER as there are a few similarities. 
As discussed before, the problems with the selectivity of the network 
protection can happen when the main power supplies is disconnected from 
the network, and the network is functioning as an island. Although, with 
regard to load flow, the DER supply the network with the needed power. 
But, in case of a fault in the network the requirements that the protection 
devices set to function properly are not fulfilled. This is explained in the 
Fig. 6.15 and Fig. 6.16. Namely, the injected fault current from DER has 
the value of 110% nominal current while settings of the protection devices 
are for 110% of the maximum line current. This means that during a fault 
on the line the value of the fault current through the line is smaller then 
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the set pick up current value of the protection device, which means no 
pick up. That means that the whole protection concept fails, due to a of 
lack of excitation. 
 
 
Fig. 6.15: Excitation current of the protection device and fault current from DER 
 
 
Fig. 6.16: Calculation of the fault current of DER 
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6.3 Implementation of the possibility of recognising the fault 
current direction 
 
This and the following Section discuss a few possible situations connected 
to the problems mentioned in Section 6.2. 
In Fig. 6.17 a distribution line protected with two directional relays is 
presented. There is a communication channel between the protection 
devices through which a signal can be sent. This signal can either be a 
release signal if a fault is seen or a blocking signal if no fault is seen. No 
signal will be sent or received from devices which are out of operation. On 
this line the attitude of the protection devices during load flow and short 
circuit current flow conditions will be discussed. The direction of the load 
flow as well as the direction of the short circuit current flow through this 
line is presented in Fig. 6.17. Let’s assume, for the purpose of these 
analyses, that the settings of the protection devices are set to manage the 
islanding operation, i.e. only DER are supplying the network and the main 
power supply is disconnected and that in the networks no overload 
situation can happen. That means that the protection devices are set to 
operate by current value of 1,1 In. 
Case 1 and Case 2 present the normal operation case of the line and 
therefore only the load flow for normail operation is calculated. In Case 1 
the protection device (PD) 1 is excited and in the Case 2 the PD 2 is 
excited. These protection devices become excited during normal operation 
when the current flowing through the line reaches the value of 110 % of 
the nominal line current In. These protection devices (in the case 1 PD 1 
and in the case 2 PD 2) are excited on one side from the criteria over-
current (corresponding to their settings) and on the other side from the 
criteria direction. The line will be disconnected only when both PD 1 and 
PD 2 see the fault. However, the problem remains that one of the PD will 
always be excited in normal operation. The solution is discussed in the 
following text. 
Case 3 presents the situation where the both protection devices see the 
fault. Namely, the fault happened inside the protected zone, so that both 
the tripping criteria direction and short circuit current are fulfilled. In this 
case PD 1 and PD 2 will both send a tripping command to the circuit 
breakers. Cases 4 and 5 present a situation when one of the PD (because 
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of internal problems) is out of operation and sees no fault current. In Case 
4 it is PD 2 and in case 5 PD 1. This problem can be solved using the so 
called echo procedure. Namely, when a situation like this occurs, then PD 
1 in Case 4 and PD 2 in Case 5 are about to send a tripping command to 
the circuit breaker and open the line because they receive no signal from 
the opposite PD, which means that the opposite PD is out of operation. 
Cases 6 and 7 present situations when the fault in the network happens 
outside the first protective zone of both PDs. Only the PD that sees the 
direction of the fault would send a tripping command as a back up 
protection.  
Case 1 
 
Normal operation: 
Load flow 
PD1 Excited 
PD2 Not excited 
Case 2  Normal operation: 
Load flow 
PD1 Not excited  
PD2 Excited 
Case 3  Fault inside the 
protection zone 
PD1 and PD2 Excited 
Case 4  Fault inside the 
protection zone 
PD1 Excited 
PD2 Not excited 
Case 5  Fault inside the 
protection zone 
PD1 Excited 
PD2 Not excited 
Case 6  Fault outside the 
protection zone 
PD1 Excited 
PD2 Not excited 
Case 7  Fault outside the 
protection zone 
PD1 Not excited 
PD2 Excited 
 
Fig. 6.17: Possible situations during a fault on a line 
PD1 PD2 
PD1 PD2 
PD1 PD2 
PD1 PD2 
PD1 PD2 
PD1 PD2 
PD1 PD2 
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6.4 New approaches in protection systems with DER 
6.4.1 Introduction 
 
The automation and protection relays are meant to ensure the system’s 
optimal operation. The protection relay must provide fault detection and 
disconnection of the damaged element selectively and fast, in order to 
avoid fault extension, and to return the rest of the system to normal 
operation [15]. Today’s power engineering is highly influenced by the 
changes in the power system that followed the deregulation, liberalisation, 
restructuring and privatisation, happening all around the world. Therefore, 
nowadays more than ever a very big importance is given to the substation 
automation and the network protection. The power companies of today 
require different approaches for making the utility industry more cost 
effective and responsive to customer needs. As a result, two important 
trends have emerged: the introduction of more automated functions and 
the use of more advanced information technology [46].  
Remote terminal units 
Historically seen, the first stage of using remote control and substation 
automation was the implementation of simple Remote Terminal Units 
(RTUs). These units have connected the mimic board and the control 
panel to the remote location for control and supervision purposes. The 
advantages of this system were that all the signals were in one processor 
and there was no need for communication among the processors, which 
simplified maintenance and configuration. The disadvantages of this 
solution were the weak processing power and no ability to follow the 
required functionality. The RTUs did not support enough communication 
ports and protocols to communicate with new protection devices which 
have more control functions. As a solution more processors were added so 
that the devices had the ability to communicate with each other. All of this 
encouraged the use of distributed control systems with integrated 
protection function. This solution quickly brought about other problems 
i.e.: higher costs, complicated system management and configuration, the 
need for high speed communication between CPUs, etc. In comparison 
with the service life of a substation, the different devices implemented in 
an automation system have short replacement cycles, and different 
generations of these devices may co-exist. When devices from different 
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manufactures or from different generations need to communicate with 
each other and if they use different communication protocols, gateways 
are mostly used to achieve interoperability. This solution is possible, but 
the disadvantages are that it is costly, with delays and errors in the 
communication [57].  
Substation automation system 
Emerging technologies in the field of information technology (IT) influence 
the secondary equipment in power systems, since more and more IT is 
used [51]. The IT relates to the technology for communications, 
processing, intelligent systems, computer networks, databases, user 
interfaces, etc. The implementation of IT for network protection purposes 
promises increased efficiency and quality of maintenance in secondary 
subsystems. The amount of data and the complexity of the network 
structure requires a very coherent data management system [57]. The 
final aim is to provide better service to the customers and to reduce the 
operating costs [54]. In Fig. 6.18 the development of the substation 
automation using the development of the implemented communication 
technology is presented.  
Fig. 6.18: Development of the substation automation 
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As a result of the technology developments, the following new 
requirements for monitoring and control are set [72]:  
• ability to track the system changes very closely; 
• ability to analyse the events and consequences automatically; 
• ability to react to system changes quickly. 
This new solution is presented using the Standards IEC 61850 and IEC 
61970. The goals that are about to be reached with the implementation of 
the standards are the following [70]:  
• From the user-point-of-view: the standards must support all the 
functions, that are present in the substations; 
• Interoperability: the IEDs from different manufacturers must be able 
to exchange information between each other, as well as use these 
information for their internal functions; 
• Flexibility of configuration: the standards must support different 
operational philosophies, as well as free settlement of functions, e.g. 
centralised or decentralised implementation; 
• Long time stability: the standards must be future-safe, which 
means, that it must be able to withstand the development of the 
communication technology.  
 
New approaches for system protection 
• Adaptive protection systems 
Adaptive protection is an online activity that modifies the preferred 
protective response to a change in system conditions or requirements. It 
is usually automatic, but can include timely human intervention [97]. An 
adaptive relay is a relay that can have its settings, characteristics or logic 
functions changed online in a timely manner by means of externally 
generated signals or control action. In other words, adaptive protection 
systems are systems which allow to change relay characteristics/settings 
due to the actual system state. For example, the primary zone pickup 
value of a distance relay can be changed online according to power infeed 
from a T-connected generator. The adaptive techniques use online 
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information of the system to optimise the protection system function. 
Some examples are: adaptive system impedance modeling (an up-to-date 
impedance model of the network that provides input data for a relay); 
adaptive sequential instantaneous tripping (for faults near the remote 
station); adaptive multi-terminal distance relay coverage (regarding 
infeed from T-connections in the relay settings); adaptive reclosure 
(prevent unsuccessful reclosure for permanent faults, high-speed 
reclosure in case of false trip). 
• Wide area protection systems 
The measured voltage and current phasors are transferred to a central 
computer where they are processed and used for monitoring, state 
estimation, protection, control and optimization. Such systems offer new 
opportunities for protection and control.  
• Intelligent systems 
Autonomous systems and computational intelligence are proposed as 
possible solutions for decentralized control. In this case adaption is 
reached by training the neural network to a certain performance, i.e. 
characteristic. The neurons can be trained in such a way that the normal 
behavior (circle) is adapted for high impedance faults.  
 
6.4.2    The standards IEC 61850 - “Communication networks and 
systems in substations” and IEC 61970 - “Energy 
Management System Application Programming Interface” 
 
Two emerging standards are related to the data interchange in substations 
– IEC 61850 and control centres – IEC 61970. 
 
6.4.2.1 Definitions IEC 61850 
In recent years the acceptance of the switchgear technology as 
“Substation Automation” with the functions of control, protection and 
monitoring has been accomplished. With the implementation of the 
Standard IEC 61850 an open communication in the substation will be 
reached. One of the main goals of IEC 61850 “Communication Networks 
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and Systems in Substations” is interoperability, i.e. the ability of 
Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) from one or several manufactures to 
exchange information and to use it to perform the functions in an 
automated system. This also includes communication between the IEDs 
for protection, monitoring, metering, control and automation in 
substations. All applied IEDs have to fulfill the following interoperability 
[49] requirements: 
• the communication standard IEC 61850 provides the Objects with all 
attributes and Services for the compatible data exchange; 
• requirements regarding functionality, performance and quality in the 
domain substation automation have to be fulfilled; 
• the Engineering has to take care that all the IEDs understand each 
other according to the „plug and play“ principle and that interactions 
with the surrounding domains (Fig. 6.19) are performed properly; 
• since any installation built by components cannot be better than its 
weakest component, sustainability regarding quality assurance and 
long-term availability of compatible IEDs is important [58]. 
 
 
Fig. 6.19: Basic principle of IEC 61850 [58] 
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The functions in the substation are performed by the protection, control, 
monitoring and recording systems. A function can be divided into sub-
functions and functional elements. The functional elements are the 
smallest parts of a function that can exchange data (communicate with 
each other) and are called logical nodes (LN) [46]. The LN may be 
implemented in a separate IEDs. The LN is an object such as, for 
example: a circuit breaker, insulator or grounding switch, current 
transformer, power transformer, switch control, measuring unit, automatic 
tap charger control, telecontrol interface, man machine interface, etc [52]. 
The LNs represent the basic object, such as the distance protection 
function in a line protection. Each LN has its own set of data. The data are 
exchanged following the rules which are called services [60]. Both the 
objects and services of Standard IEC 61850 have to be defined in such a 
way that all functional requirements of the process control by the 
Substation Automation System (SAS) can be fulfilled. 
In substations, functions for control, automation and protection may be 
very complex and in order to have error-free performance they need to 
interact with some IEDs. For example, the distance protection works only 
by cooperation of the distance relay, current and voltage transformer, 
circuit breaker and HMI (Human Machine Interface). The last one is 
needed for presentation of fault information, reading and writing of 
parameters, etc (Fig. 6.20). 
 
 
Fig. 6.20: Example for the allocation of functions and LN to IEDs [58] 
Function
Synchron
Swiching
X
X
Function
Distance -
Protection
X X
X
X
Function
Over current-
Protection
X X X
X X X
X X
HMI (Working place)
Synchr. Switching
Distance protection
Over current protection
Breaker 
CT (local) 
VT (local)
VT (bus bar) 
Logical Nodes
(Main functions)
Devices (IEDs) 
 94 
In the following the most important function groups are listed [55]: 
• system functions like control and time synchronisation; 
• parameter- and configuration management; 
• information presentation e.g. single line scheme, alarms, measured 
values, events; 
• data acquisition of: topology or data changes, measured values, 
limit over reaching, faults, defects; 
• network monitoring: e.g. fault analyses, power quality; monitoring 
of the primary equipment: switchgear, transformer, power lines; 
monitoring of the secondary equipment: e.g. watch dog by the 
protection devices; 
• switchgear equipment (with interlocking, Synchro-check): switching 
with confirmation reply; 
• protection of: power lines, transformers, bus bars, generators; 
• automatic functions e.g.: synchro-check, re-closure. 
 
6.4.2.2 Communication realisation with IEC 61850 
 
The peer-to-peer communications in SAS are based on a Generic 
Substation Event (GSE). The GSE is based on the asynchronous reporting 
status of an IED’s functional elements to other devices enrolled in the 
process. The generic data and services are mapped to a mainstream 
communication stack comprising Manufacturing Message Specification 
(MMS), Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP), and 
Ethernet. In this sense, the GSE replaces the hard wired control signal 
exchange between IEDs, for example, for interlocking and protection 
purposes.  
The exchanged information can be divided into operational and 
configurational information [66]. Operational information includes status 
and control tasks and configurational information includes file transfer and 
changing settings tasks. Under real time conditions two other types of 
messages are also exchanged. Namely, the first type of message 
containing one or a few bits of information is mostly used for data 
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containing commands for blocking, release, tripping, indication of position 
of switchgear in automatic sequences, interlocking, protection and other 
data exchanges between peer devices. This type of message is called 
Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE). The other type of 
message (Generic Substation Status Event (GSSE)) is for sampled values, 
used for sending streams of analogue data such as current and voltage 
samples [71]. The transfer of the real time data, settings and disturbance 
files is on a common 100Mbit/s network [48]. The data may be classified 
with regards to response or time requirements. The classes cover 
communication and response times between 3 ms (protection trip) and 
1000 ms (file transfer). Also classes for time synchronization are defined 
ranging from 1 ms (time tagging of events) down to 1 μs (samples, 
phases) [58]. 
 
6.4.2.3 Definitions IEC 61970 
 
The Standard IEC 61970 “Energy Management System Application 
Programming Interface” (EMS-API) normalises a set of APIs for the 
manipulation of real-time critical, near real-time and historical EMS / 
SCADA data. The specification defines an elaborate model called Common 
Information Model (CIM). 
The definition is object-oriented, for example: the CIM Measurement has 
relationships to MeasurementType and MeasurementValue. A number of 
Measurements can be attached to Terminal of conducting equipment, such 
as Breaker. The current position of a breaker can be defined with two data 
items: 
Breaker.Terminal.Measurement.MeasurementType.name and 
Breaker.Terminal.Measurement.MeasurementValue.name. 
The above example shows that the common domain semantics 
standardises data exchange, irrespective of internal EMS/SCADA 
implementation models. It enables integration with EMS systems od 
different vendors, as soon as they provide the CIM view of their data and 
the IEC 61970 APIs implementation for exchange of that data [72].  
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6.4.2.4 Protection data management system 
 
Once the relevant information is extracted, it can be distributed to 
multiple users responsible for maintaining the quality and reliability of the 
energy supply service. The real time serial bus technologies enable a large 
volume of data to be transferred between different components of the 
system. Various communication media can be used such as fibre optic 
cables or shielded copper cables. [47,48]. 
When the data are obtained from several types of IEDs such as digital 
fault recorders (DFRs), digital relays (DR), power quality (PQ) meters, 
remote terminal units (RTUs), sequence of event recorders (SERs), 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) and circuit breaker monitoring 
(CBM) devices, then they can be analysed (Fig. 6.21). In this way the 
analysis includes both fault and power quality disturbances as well as 
detailed information of operation of switchgear and protection relays. 
These data are helpful for the managers (reliability and efficiency of the 
system operation), protection engineers (fault clearing equipment, 
protection relays), maintenance crews (switchgears operation), customer 
service (quality of power supply, fulfilment of power delivery contracts) 
and dispatchers (fault location and system operation restoration) [50,53]. 
Such a Protection Data Management System (PDMS) provides access to 
accurate and reliable information gathered by protection related devices, 
to aid faster and easier finding and solving of problems connected with the 
network protection system. An information system, which deals with 
dynamic information generated in different substations, has to execute the 
following main steps: data collection, data communication, data archiving 
and applying algorithms to generate information, information hosting for 
different user groups [53]. 
The initial collection of field data is done in numerical devices deployed for 
protection [55], monitoring or control. To benefit from this data at any 
time, remote access has to be established, which means sufficient 
communication facilities are a prerequisite, enabling data and information 
flow from the devices to the different user groups. Information generated 
from the collected data has to be presented in the way user groups are 
used to. Depending on the amount of the generated raw data and the 
storage and calculation capacity of the used devices, it might be advisable 
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to install data concentrators in the stations. This increases application 
speed, minimizes communication bandwidth and enables an economical 
use of storage capacity [46].  
 
 
Fig. 6.21: Data integration and information exchange [53] 
 
In this sense, protection management means handling, supervising and 
control of the protection system [66]. A model of the protection life cycle 
is presented in Fig. 6.22. The life cycle is divided into four functional 
sections: planning, standards & functional design; detail design & 
construction; commissioning & testing and operation & maintenance. 
Under the planning and standards functions, protection engineers are 
concerned with the requirements to put up a reliable, well coordinated and 
economic protection system based on acceptable standards. The 
functional design is derived to tighten up the planned requirements for 
implementation. In the detail design and construction functions, protection 
engineers ensure that functionality is included in the scheme. At the same 
time, the design and construction of protective system assemblies must 
also be simple and consistent to prudent utility practice. The 
commissioning and testing function involved in ensuring that the 
protective devices are properly interconnected and tested to verify its 
scheme and system integrity. They also certify that the system is finally 
safe for commissioning after applying appropriate settings. The protection 
systems are then maintained throughout their lifetime. During operation 
the working condition of the protection system is monitored until 
refurbishment is required to enhance the capability of the protection 
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system (see Table 6.1). Also this is done to provide indications for future 
plans [61]. 
 
  
Fig. 6.22: Protection System Life Cycle [54] 
 
The new protection system based on communication gives highest 
attention to security, availability and the wide range of required function, 
and takes into account the following guidelines: availability, security, 
dependability; application of well accepted standards; system scalability; 
flexibility ; and performance/price ratio. 
 
Table 6.1 according to[61] 
Type of Analysis Functional Use Frequency of Analysis 
Reliability and Economic Planning 5-10 years 
System Impact Planning Major Project 
System Review Planning 2-3 years 
Operational Operations Short-term changes (1-
6) months 
Settings & Coordination Planning/ Commissioning Every new system added 
Investigative Operations Every system fault 
Performance Audit Operations Yearly 
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6.4.2.5 Substation Automation System (SAS): realisation and 
availability 
 
The traditional approach to data acquisition and processing for the control 
and protection assumes that the needs are served by independent 
instrumentation and controller infrastructures. Protective devices are 
connected directly to the switchyard via dedicated wiring typically 
terminated in the substation control house where the protection is 
installed. The Energy Management System (EMS), responsible for the 
overall power system control, is connected to the power system via 
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system. The SCADA 
system acquires and processes field data through RTUs that are wired to 
the substation switchyard and located in the control house [73]. In today’s 
practise, the local substation protection and control solutions are 
independent from EMS and SCADA systems, and there is no data 
integration or information exchange. In addition a variety of monitoring 
devices are installed at the substation level for the purpose of acquiring 
and processing substation field data. This equipment is independent from 
the data acquisition and processing infrastructure for the system control 
and protection. The information exchange between these two types of 
equipment is limited. The main characteristics of the SCADA and EMS are: 
• network-wide action with utilizing static or quasi-static view of 
the power system,handling of long-term non-dynamic 
phenomena in power systems, provision of a steady state data 
in slow time intervals, 
• no ability to take any kind of dynamics, either control actions or 
oscillation, BUTthey can operate coordinated with other systems 
and equipment.  
The standard IEC 61850 presents a new solution for the substation 
automation system. Namely, most functions in substations are divided 
into three levels; station level, bay level and process level (Fig. 6.23). It is 
very common that the IEDs providing these functions are also allocated to 
these three levels [49]. The station level contains components such as 
SCADA, System protection unit, remote control, gate way and firewall, 
real time signal receivers and others. 
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Fig. 6.23: Example of configuration of a substation automation system (SAS) 
 
These components are interconnected with the bay level and between 
each other via a TCP/IP based Ethernet station bus. The bay level units 
contain an extensive range of protection and control functions which 
represent the heart of the system functionality [60,65]. 
The standard IEC 61850 focuses on a subset of interfaces (IF) shown in 
Fig. 6.23 and listed below: 
IF1: protection data exchange between bay and station level; 
IF2: protection data exchange between bay level and remote protection; 
IF3: data exchange within bay level; 
IF4: CT and VT instantaneous data exchange (especially samples) 
between process and bay level; 
IF5: control data exchange between process and bay level; 
IF6: control data exchange between bay and station level; 
IF7: data exchange between substation (level) and a remote engineer’s 
workplace; 
IF8: direct data exchange between the bays especially for fast functions 
like interlocking; 
IF9: data exchange within the station level; 
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IF10: control data exchange between substation (devices) and a remote 
control centre. 
The main feature of the SAS is a very high processing capacity [57]. Each 
unit can simultaneously manage several bays and they can work in 
parallel to provide increased redundancy. These units are connected to the 
primary equipment via a real time process bus with intelligent I/O 
(input/output; reading and writing) units of the process level located 
directly in the switchgear. I/O units perform all necessary input signal pre-
processing like A/D conversion, digital filtering, phase calculation, etc.  
The approaches of the standard IEC 61850 present a solution of [73]:  
• integration of the protective system; 
• integrated SAS; 
• EMS integrated with SAS; 
• total system integration. 
In the sense of the total system integration the present idea solution in 
the area of Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS) are meant. The WAMS 
are based on accurate measurements, have ability of load monitoring and 
fast control of network controllers. The Wide Area Protection (WAP) might 
be seen as a part of WAMS. The main characteristics of WAP are:  
• presenting a dynamic view of the system , 
• management of all kinds of stability and cascaded outages, 
• taking fast, optimised and coordinated actions.The benefits of the 
implementation of the standard IEC 61850 for the SAS can be presented 
in the perspectives of: planning, operation, engineering, and maintenance. 
The improvement of the protection functions, substation control, EMS 
control and the system wide monitoring are also a consequence of using 
this standard.  
To calculate the system availability, component availabilities taken into 
consideration are given in Table 6.2 [57].  
 
Table 6.2: Component availabilities according to [57] 
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Component Availability 
Transducers (T) 1 hour/year – 99.988% 
I/O unit (card) 1 hour/year – 99.988% 
CPU unit (P) 6 hours/year – 99.931% 
Communication unit (C) 12 hours/year – 99.863% 
(not calculating communication line outage) 
 
Availability for units connected serially can be calculated as:  
A = (A1* A2*A3*…*An)       (6.1) 
And for units connected in parallel 
A = (1-(1-A1)*(1-A2)*…*(1-An))      (6.2) 
Availability in classical solution with RTU is: 
A = AT*AI*AP*AC = 99.77%, which means 20 hours of outage for the 
control.  
The availability situation for the protection is essentially better:  
A = AI*AP = 99.919% with 7.1 hours of outage only.  
Using a distributed system means a certain improvement, concerning the 
availability, but not so much in absolute figures, more in the fact that the 
whole substation can “never be lost”. Calculation shows:  
A =AI*AP*AC = 99.782%, which means 19 hours of outage for control.  
The availability of the protection stays the same: 
A = AI*AP = 99.919% with 7.1 hours of outage. 
The new system architecture presented in this Section changes the picture 
with redundancy. With only two parallel CPUs can be calculated:  
A = AI *(1-(1-AP*AC)*(1-AP*AC)) = 99.987%, that means 1.1 hours of 
outage for control, as well as for protection. 
Comparing these results, with the results before, it is evident that the 
availability of the control has improved nearly 20 times, and the 
availability of the protection system 7 times. 
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6.4.3 Communication in distribution networks with DER 
 
As uncertainty in power systems grows resulting from deregulation and 
liberalisation on the energy markets, power system protection concerning 
the secure network operation will play an increasingly important role. With 
the implementation of DER on the distribution systems and corresponding 
changes on the power flow, new requests are expected to be set to the 
protection devices (PDs). In such a complicated network structure the 
requirements of the PDs are rising. The importance of faster fault clearing 
times and better selectivity, smaller outage areas, etc. in a deregulated 
energy market is becoming very important. Nowadays, sophisticated 
protection relays can not only rely on logic installed in the 
microprocessors. A secure communication for fast data exchange between 
the devices is also becoming essential [61]. The Internet protocol (IP) 
based networks using the wide area time transfer system GPS (global 
positioning system) have been widely employed for power system 
communication. In some countries like Japan [62] and the USA the IP 
based networks have already been successfully used as communication 
links within, to and from control centres and substations [52,56]. Also, the 
PD communication is ready to be put to use.  
The settings of the protection systems of today were made when DER 
were not present in the distribution network. Since the implementation of 
DER in the power systems, an analysis of the settings and protection 
concepts has to be made. Changes of the protection concepts are 
possible, depending on the amount of short circuit current in feed from 
DER. But, a secure decentralised protection is possible with the well-
known protection criteria of today: over-current (grading for radial 
networks and directional grading for networks operating in rings), 
differential, distance, etc. With this the principle of primary and back up 
protection can be successfully realised. The implementation of DER on the 
distribution network and the secure operation on the networks today relies 
on communication and management systems. The data of the weather 
forecast (wind, water, sun), other forecasts (gas, biomass), energy 
generation in ¼ hours day profile, energy import–export, energy storage, 
the DER application, online-optimisation, etc. are managed by the energy 
management system. The control stations via communication links inform 
the DER of their schedule application [62,64]. The communication can be 
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realised using radio communication links, power line communication 
(PLC), ripple control, etc. With the possibility to implement the 
communication as a part of the protection system, a few ideas are 
applicable. 
As a visualisation of the functionality of the new protection principle an 
illustration network is given on Fig. 6.24. The “decentralised” protection in 
this variant is going to be seen as a back–up protection system. This 
„decentralised“ protection is equal to today’s state of the art over-current, 
distance or differential protection (explained previously). The 
“decentralised” protection is of course parameterised with the necessary 
settings to satisfy the criteria of back up protection in the sense of 
selectivity. As a primary protection system, protection scheme based on a 
phasor and state of the circuit breakers is proposed as an extension of the 
energy management system. The installed numerical protections are able 
to measure and to transmit time-stamped phasors of the voltages and 
currents to the system protection unit installed at the energy management 
system. If protection systems with local control function are used, they 
can also provide information about the feeder (state of circuit breaker, 
grounding switch and isolators).  
If there is a fault in the network, the primary protection is the one that 
should localise the fault and send via the communication link the tripping 
command to the circuit breakers. If there is a faulty communication, the 
main protection role uses the “decentralised” back–up protection with a 
delay time of 200–300ms. 
It is important to stress that this new solution based on communication 
also requires also a sensor type of current transformers, according to the 
higher sampling rate. 
As said before this protection methode is based on phasor measurements. 
Phasors are presentation of U and I at diff. buses of power system and 
they define the state of the power system using DFT. The main 
characteristics of the phasors are:  
• phasor is a complex number associated with a sinusoidal wave; 
• phasor magnitude is the same as the sinusoidal wave magnitude; 
• phasor phase angle is the phase of the wave at t=0; 
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• phasor is associated with a single frequency; 
• the time dimension is removed from the phasor based Eqs.; 
• phase is the indicator of the dynamic performance of the system 
with the swing Eq., machine oscillating modes can be determined by 
measuring the phase angle of the positive-sequence voltage phasor 
at the machine terminals. 
 
In this sense a transient state on a power network is a condition in which 
the magnitude, phase angle, or frequency of one or more bus voltages 
become a function of time.  
The phasor measurement follows with a reference determinate in the 
moment of measurement. Essential is synchronisation of the sampling 
data. Today synchronisation accuracies of order 1µs are possible. The time 
tagged phasor measurements in SPC can be compared with the data from 
a previous instant, which can be used for control.  
The idea and a basic realisation of the implementation of communication 
for the purposes of protecting a line will be presented in the following 
[67]. The network presented on Fig. 6.24 contains 7 busbars and 8 lines. 
Each circuit breaker (two at the ends of each line) can be tripped either by 
the bus bar protection, line primary protection or directional over-current 
protection located at each substation. 
The necessary information collected at each substation includes: 
• the current values (magnitude and direction) of all feeders 
connected to the station; 
• the network topology; 
• the status of all PDs and circuit breakers located at every station. 
 
The information sent to the neighbouring stations includes: the 
identification of the confirmed faulted line (CFL), if one has been found; 
and the status of the local PDs and circuit breakers. Once a decision of 
CFL is made, locally or from a received message, a proper delay time for 
every PD in the network according to the stored network topology will be 
sent. For the exchange of data power line carrier, microwave, pilot wire 
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and optic cables can be used. To improve the efficiency of communication, 
Ethernet can also be used. Sending information over high speed (100 
Mbps – 1Gbps) may solve the problems of traditional communication 
media (speed, damage of the communication media, unreliability).  
 
 
Fig. 6.24: Using of the standard for SAS IEC 61850 for protection systems 
 
 
Fig. 6.25: Block diagram of the algorithm for data exchange 
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The communication between the substation and the PDs can be achieved 
via a local area network (LAN) within a substation or via a dedicated link. 
The communication between neighbouring substation can be realised via a 
wide area network (WAN) or dedicated link. The algorithm for the internal 
data exchange as well as between substations is given in Fig. 6.25.  
In case of a short circuit, the primary protection is the one that should 
localise the fault and send the tripping command to the circuit breakers 
via the communication channel. In case of a faulty communication, 
missing data, or other problems, the “decentralised” back – up protection 
takes over the protection role and clears the fault with a time - delay. In 
this sense, this protection is required to operate only when the main 
protection fails to clear the fault.  
 
 
Fig. 6.26: Block diagram of the protection algorithm  
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breakers locates the fault in the network [68]. This procedure is given in a 
block diagram in Fig. 6.26.  
In the following paragraphs, simulations of a small network will be shown 
and the protection scheme discussed in detail. As an illustration of this 
principle see Fig. 6.24. A fault as shown on the Fig. 6.24 is considered. 
The main protection system according to the presented procedure locates 
the fault and sends in the shortest possible time a tripping command to 
the circuit breaker on the line protected with the protection device 14  
 
If the main protection unit fails to operate during this fault, the 
decentralised protection, namely the protection device 14 will clear the 
fault with appropriate time delay.  
In case of mal function of the circuit breakers located on this line, the 
neighbouring substations will get this information as well. The protection 
device 9, and the protection device 7, are set to operate in a delay. These 
units will clear the fault. With these characteristics, this protection concept 
characterise itself with high reliability [67]. 
In the presented example the management of the measured data is 
realised within the system protection centre (see Fig. 6.27). 
 
 
Fig. 6.27: Structure of WAMS 
 
The WAMS contain the following hardware units: 
• phasor measurement units (PMU); 
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• communication links; 
• central unit – PC. 
The PMU contains the units given in Fig. 6.27a. The main application of a 
PMU are:  
• state estimation – most important part of monitoring the power 
system, 
• instability prediction – real time stability analysis, 
• adaptive relaying - dynamic relay settings enabling a better 
response to power swings, 
• improved control of power systems – direct feedback to 
controllers (VSC, UPFC, etc.), dynamic control of the power 
system.  
 
 Fig. 6.27a: Bacis block diagramm of PMU 
 
The system protection centre collects, synchronizes and sorts collected 
measurements. The ability to provide needed data for any application, as 
well as the robustness (resistance against poor quality of input data) and 
the fast execution are obtained. 
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6.5 New concept of network protection based on additional 
signal injection 
 
Another possibility for the protection of the network is injection of a signal 
with additional frequency (e.g. 120 kHz) or an interharmonic, non-
characteristic frequency into the network at a specified position. This 
signal will be measured on each feeder in the substations, either by newly 
installed logical units or by extended numerical relays. This new protection 
scheme, based on a non-characteristic frequency, has only one source in 
the system, the fundamental frequency has multiple sources from the 
networks as well as by DERs. This logical protection scheme uses the well-
known reverse interlocking. 
As an illustration of this principle see Fig. 6.28 and Figs. 6.29a-e. This 
idea will also be shown in a simulation of a small utility network. 
 
Fig. 6.28: The idea of using signal injection for protection systems 
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protection principle can be realised simply by using the reverse blocking 
function.  
In MATLAB the presented test network has been realised for investigating 
this fault location method. In the test network (Fig. 6.28) a signal with f = 
80 Hz has been injected. 
In the following diagrams the results of the analysis of the signal 
spreading through the network with and without a fault present in the 
network are presented. The first column of the table presents the 
frequency spectra of the measured signals on three different nodes of the 
network: between line segments, on the spot of the fault and on the load 
node, before a fault has occurred on the protected line. 
Fig. 6.29a and Fig 6.29b present the frequency spectrum on the node 
between the line segments (Fault Locator 1), zoomed frequency spectra 
are presented. Fig. 6.29c and Fig 6.29d present the frequency spectum on 
the fault node between the line segments (Fault Locator 2). Fig. 6.29e and 
Fig. 6.29f present the frequency spectrum on the load node (Fault Locator 
3).  
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Fig. 6.29a: Source signal 
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Fig. 6.29b Source signal 
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Fig. 6.29c between line segments 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
Frequenz [Hz]
A
m
pli
tu
de
Frequenzspektrum
data1
source-data
 
Fig. 6.29d between line segments 
 
For the analysis of this fault location method the figures of the frequency 
spectrum measured at the point of load are important. Fig. 6.29e gives 
the frequency spectrum on the node Load before the occurrence of the 
fault on the line.  
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Fig. 6.29e: Frequency spectrum on the node Load before the fault 
 
As it can be seen in Fig. 6.29f the injected frequency of 80 Hz is measured 
with the amplitude of A = 1000 V.  
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Fig. 6.29f: Frequency spectrum on the node Load after the fault 
When a fault occurs, the amplitude of the injected signal on the node Load 
drops to a value of A = 220 V. With this, the fault locator unit can inform 
the main protection device that on the line segment before, a fault has 
occurred (see Fig. 6.29f).  
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7. E- learning – The new teaching method 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
During recent years traditional education system has changed to a new 
way of teaching, namely e-learning, in order to keep up with the modern 
society. The modern society is challenged from the global orientation of 
the world economy, strong competition and the change of the social 
structure. Furthermore, modern information and communication 
technologies are transforming the way people learn. With the advent of 
the Internet and the multiple formats that can be communicated over the 
World Wide Web, there are now several new and exciting ways to present 
teaching information. The two principal features of the e-learning platform 
are the delivery of information and data, in electronic format as didactical 
units e.g. courses, lessons and checking of the training results. 
Hypermedia offers a great potential as a framework for modern e-learning 
tools as it allows for the incorporation of constructive learning strategies. 
The new information techniques make it possible to optimise the 
requirements of a modern society, so a lot of institutions for higher 
education throughout the world are developing and offering new teaching 
methods to the students, as so called virtual teaching [70].  
Protection technique as one of the fundamental disciplines of power 
system engineering has always played a very important role in the 
security and reliability of electric power systems. The safety of electrical 
power systems and the protection of electrical equipment benefited with 
the advance of microprocessor technology implemented in protection 
technique. Yet, because of the complexity of the electrical power system 
and influencing factors mentioned in previous chapters, protection 
technique remains a challenging discipline [71].  
The presentation of the realised e-learning course is as follows. In 7.2.1 
the structure of the teaching tool is presented. In 7.2. the chapter 
contents and the realisation of the teaching tool are explained. The 
results, namely the feed back from the users of this e-learning course, are 
given in 7.3. 
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7.2 E-learning system - Virtual protection technique 
7.2.1 Structure of the e-learning system  
 
The module “Virtual Protection Technique” is realised as a group of 
chapters: Basic Principles of the Digital Protection Devices, Fuses, Over-
current Protection, Differential Protection, Distance Protection, Over/Under 
Voltage Protection and Over/Under Frequency Protection [12]. The basis 
for the realization of the E-learning system is a theoretical scenario based 
on the existing lecture [74-86]. In developing the modules, the first goal 
was to capture the attention and then encourage the interest of the 
student. In order to be able to convey the content with some charm, a lot 
of attention has been paid to construct clear and straightforward ways to 
introduce the teaching concepts. This has been realized for example, by 
using different types of animations and introductory videos. All the 
chapters are available from the main menu of the module. The logical 
structure of the chapters enables the student to easily follow the study 
material. The imparted knowledge is divided into two parts: the first part 
is the basic knowledge constructed mainly as small text blocks, joined 
with figures, tables, graphics, animations -acoustic and non-acoustic- and 
simulations. The second part is the deepened knowledge, additional 
contents of teaching, internal and also Internet links. It is also possible to 
download the teaching materials. Generally the chapters are divided into 
basic principles, function and implementation on the power system of each 
of the discussed types of protection. The teaching module is supported 
with numerous MATLAB simulations that give an illustration and 
visualisation of the complexity of the protection technique.  
 
7.2.2 Chapter contents and Realisation 
The first chapter - Basic Principles of the Digital Protection Devices - gives 
an introduction to the power protection technique. In this chapter the 
elements that one digital protection system contains, in order to fulfil the 
task of protection are given. The task of protection of the electrical 
equipment and personnel from over voltages, short current and so on, as 
well as the principal function and the implementation of the power 
protection technique in the network with the different types of protection 
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devices are explained in this chapter. This chapter also includes a report 
of the development of the protection devices (mechanical, electrical, 
digital) and definitions of the requirements of the modern digital 
protection devices [75]. The confrontations between some of the 
requirements (for example promptness and costs) are also explained and 
some problems concerning this are discussed. The student has the 
possibility via external links to get additional information directly from a 
few manufacturers listed on the site. Fig. 7.3 and Fig. 7.4 give some of 
the basic protection principles. Fig. 7.3 shows the basic protection 
principles like: over-current, current – difference, current – phase angle – 
difference and the method of calculation using the symmetrical 
components. Fig. 7.4 shows the basic protection principles like: 
impedance, power direction, over and under voltage, frequency and also 
some additional criteria for fault location like temperature, etc. By clicking 
on the type of protection of interest to the user, one can get further 
additional information (deepening knowledge). The student has the 
possibility via external links to get additional information directly from a 
few manufacturers listed on the site [77].  
The second chapter - Fuses - discuses the functional principle of this type 
of protection and in a few examples shows its implementation in the 
network. This type of protection is usually used for protection of 
distribution lines and small transformers on the low voltage level. Some 
examples from the industry implementation of fuses are also given.  
The third chapter – Over-Current Protection - discuses its functional 
principle and implementation in the network [15]. An algorithm of this 
type of protection is also presented. The function of the protection is 
illustrated in a few MATLAB simulations. Fig. 7.5 is an illustration of this 
chapter. Namely, it presents the different types of over-current protection 
principles. Also, an example of time grading of the over-current protection 
devices in one protected distribution line is given, and a basic algorithm 
presenting the principle of function of one over-current protection device 
is shown. This chapter shows how a student gets familiar with the 
realisation of one over-current time dependent digital protection device. 
Step by step procedure of programming in MATLAB is explained. The 
student has the possibility of changing a few parameters (time settings) of 
the protection device and with that she/he can make some conclusions 
concerning the function of this type of protection devices on her/his own. 
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Fig. 7.3: Basic principles of the digital protection 
 
 
Fig. 7.4: Basic principles of the digital protection 
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Fig. 7.5: Animated realisation of an over-current time dependent digital 
protection device 
 
Fig. 7.6: Which elements contain the digital protection? 
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The chapter Differential Protection first provides a brief theoretical 
introduction providing explanations concerning the differential protection. 
In a few basic MATLAB examples the function of this type of protection is 
presented, and the implementation in the network is shown [76]. The 
application of the differential protection devices from the industry is also 
presented in a few examples, and with this the student receives 
information about the functional principle and application of this type of 
protection in the power system. The problems of current transformer 
saturation and their impact on the differential protection devices are also 
discussed in a few examples (Fig. 7.7). 
 
 
Fig. 7.7: Functional principle of differential protection 
 
The chapter - Distance Protection – analyses the functional principles of 
different distance protection algorithms starting from the classical 
(differential equations, filters and stationary equations) to the new 
artificial methods - parameter estimation, harmonic activated neuronal 
networks – HANN, of impedance -distance to the fault- calculation. A few 
MATLAB examples of comparison between the algorithms in a sense of 
promptness and sensitivity are given [79]. In Fig. 7.8 the results of a 
MATLAB – simulation for the function of a digital distance protection 
device are presented. In this example the results of the algorithm of 
Phadke/Ibrahim are shown. This type of algorithm belongs to the group of 
so called filter algorithms. The calculation of the line parameters 
(impedance and angle) follows after the deviation of the complex values of 
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the measured signals of current and voltage. The principle of function of 
this algorithm as well as for the other types of algorithms is shown to the 
students in a step by step format. Fig. 7.8 presents an example where a 
single line fault (phase A) occurs at the moment t = 0.2 s and the 
algorithm gives the trip command to the circuit breaker after t = 8 ms. 
The student can choose between the different types of algorithms and 
study the differences and obtain conclusions by carrying out simulations 
under different fault conditions.  
In the chapters - Over/Under Voltage Protection - and - Over/Under 
Frequency Protection - a few MATLAB examples show the implementation 
of these types of protection in the network. The functional principles and 
application are also presented.  
Finally, the last chapter - “Picture of the Future” concerns the settings of 
the digital protection devices implemented in a distribution network with 
DER. A test distribution network with DER is chosen to illustrate the 
setting problems of the implemented network protection [80]. 
 
Fig. 7.8: MATLAB – Simulation: Distance protection 
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In this module a virtual practical exercise of three different protection 
devices is also implemented. The practical exercise is part of the lecture in 
the protection technique laboratory of the faculty. The student has the 
possibility to learn the use of the over-current, distance and differential 
protection devices, the construction of a tripping characteristic, as well as 
the response of the different protection devices under normal, overload 
and fault conditions. For teamwork among the students some virtual 
seminars are included. They are meant to occur at the end of the virtual 
lecture as a final report [83]. 
 
7.3 Results of implementation of e-learning system 
In the multimedia laboratory 15 students were selected as a testing group 
for the module of digital protection. The students were of three different 
nationalities (German, Polish, Ukrainian) and between the ages of 22 and 
27. Most of them (9) are studying in the master program offered at the 
university and the rest of them (6) are in the diploma program [83].  
Nationality Nr. of tested students Age 
German 6 1*22, 2*23, 3*25 
Polish 4 1*22, 1*23, 2*24 
Ukrainian 5 2*22, 3*23 
 
Matter Nr. of tested students 
Previous Knowledge in the subject 1 
Understanding the material 14 
 
In the following table the number of students is listed considering the 
preferred type of studying (conventional or e-learning). 
Matter Conventional  
way of studying 
e-
learning 
No answer/ 
both 
Understanding the material 6 6 3 
Clarity of the teaching material 1 10 4 
Knowledge check up 2 10 3 
Studying home 0 15 0 
Possibility of communication 
during the studying (with lecturer 
or with other students) 
 
11/9 
 
4/3 
 
0/3 
 
In terms of the knowledge check-up the students wrote the following 
remarks: 
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They find a small test better in checking their knowledge and they see it 
as a preparation for the main exam. Some students (2, nat. Ukrainian) 
even prefer only on-line tests and exams. They also find the short test a 
very good opportunity to review what was taught on the day and in this 
way they see a possibility of studying better and faster. 
Matter Grade 
Presentation of teaching 
material 
6*A + 9*B 
Presentation of tables 5*A + 10*B 
Presentation of Animations 6*A + 9*B 
Figure selection 2*A + 13*B 
Graphics selection 8*A + 7*B 
Overview of the teaching 
material 
9*A + 6*B 
Navigation realisation 7*A + 8*B 
 
In terms of the preferred way of studying, below are some comments 
from the students:  
• Some of the students (4, nat. German, Ukrainian and Polish) prefer 
the e-learning way of studying and they are willing to see it as a 
substitution of the conventional method of studying; They find this 
method of studying easier to understand and better than the 
conventional way of studying;  
• Some of the students (5, nat. German, Ukrainian and Polish) prefer 
the conventional way of studying, but they do not mind using e-
learning as a illustrative method for gaining more knowledge, or a 
possibility of re-caping. The main reason for this is that this group of 
students misses the lecturer and his/her explaination during the 
virtual studying (although there were some acoustic explanation 
implemented in the e-learning at the points we thought needed). 
Some students from this group prefer going to the library to get 
additional knowledge, rather than surfing on the web; 
The rest of the students (6, nat. German, Ukrainian and Polish) see e-
learning as an addition to the conventional way of studying, or studying at 
home and discussion with fellow students (who are also on-line). This 
group of students also prefers the possibility of using a PC during 
studying. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The continuously rising implementation of DER in the distribution network 
requests analyses of the present network protection concepts. Depending 
on the type of connection to the network, the influences of the DER on the 
network protection systems vary. This dissertation concentrates on the 
analyses of the influence of implementation of small DER, which are 
connected to the network via an inverter. 
The first problem discussed in this dissertation is the influence of high 
level of harmonics on the protection devices. The rising implementation of 
power electronic devices into the network, both on the side of the energy 
generation and energy consumption, leads to a high level of injected 
harmonics into the network. The influence of a high amount of harmonics, 
according to the Standard IEC 61000-3–2, on different types of algorithms 
implemented in different types of protection devices was investigated 
using a test network. The tested algorithms implemented in the distance 
protection devices were based on conventional methods such as steady 
state algorithms, algorithms using the differential equation of first or 
second order written for the protected line, algorithms based on the filter 
approach, and on the “new” methods using artificial intelligence i.e.: 
parametrical estimation and harmonic activated neuronal networks. The 
different types of protection devices that were investigated were based on 
the principle of over-current (definite-current and inverse time), distance 
and differential. Some of the tests were conducted in the protection 
technique laboratory at the university. From both tests (simulation and 
practical) it is concluded that the state-of-the-art protection devices are 
insensitive to harmonics according to the allowed level by the standard 
IEC 61000-3–2. The tendency of today’s protection technology engineers 
lies in searching for ways to shorten of the calculation time of the 
algorithms. 
The second problem discussed is the challenge set to the network 
protection systems in the distribution networks with implemented DER. A 
few examples illustrate the situation of the energy supply of the future 
illustrate the problems of lack of protection with the present protection 
concepts. In this sense, this work presents and analyses a protection 
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concept in distribution networks with DER, using the substation 
automation system and the protection management system based on the 
new standard IEC 61850 for communication networks in substations. The 
method of using an additional signal injection as additional criteria for the 
presented network protection concept is also discussed. 
The basis for efficient protection system management is the knowledge of 
power system performance under fault and normal operation (service) 
conditions as well as the switchgear interfaces. This requires a proper 
knowledge of power system engineering. With a changeable power system 
infrastructure, the protection system management becomes a real 
challenge to the network protection experts. Computer- and internet 
technology, modern serial communications, sharing of data with other 
disciplines and a trend towards system engineering require a broader 
knowledge and close co-operation with others, beside the protection 
system engineers. 
With the goal of spreading the knowledge of network protection systems, 
in the frames of this work a special e-learning course was realised. The 
internet provides new possibilities for gaining and spreading knowledge. 
The time and place independence, the high amount of possibilities for 
knowledge sources and on line discussions are just a few of the 
possibilities. In this work, the idea, the realisation and the implementation 
of this new way of teaching and studying digital network protection 
alongside the conventional way are presented as well. An importance is 
also given to the feed back of the user of the e-learning course. This 
course is offered to the students at the university in a specially realised 
multimedia laboratory and used for gaining knowledge in the area of 
network protection technique. The possibility of using the course at home 
for re-capitulation of the taught material and for self-test is also possible, 
by simply logging on to the e-learning course. This course could also be 
used by engineers who want to refresh their knowledge in the form of a 
fast (self) training. 
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9. Zusammenfassung 
 
Die stetig steigende Anbindung von dezentralen Energieerzeugern (DER) 
an Mittel- (MS) und Niederspannungsnetze (NS) fordert eine Analyse der 
bestehenden Netzschutzkonzepte. Die Beeinflussung der 
Netzschutzkonzepte ist abhängig davon, wie die DER an das 
Mittelspannungsnetz angebunden sind. Die vorliegende Arbeit konzentriert 
sich auf die Analyse von Beeinflussungen durch kleine DER, die an das 
Mittelspannungsnetz über einen Umrichter angebunden sind.  
Das erste Problem, das in dieser Arbeit untersucht ist, ist die 
Beeinflussung der unterschiedlichen Schutzalgorithmen durch hohe Anteile 
von Harmonischen. Diese werden verursacht durch die steigende Zahl 
elektrischer Geräte, sowohl auf der Verbraucherseite als auch auf der 
Seite der Energieerzeuger. Die Beeinflussung, entsprechend der Norm IEC 
61000-3–2, wurde an unterschiedlichen Typen von Netzschutzsystemen 
untersucht. Die getesteten Distanzschutzalgorithmen basierten auf 
konventionellen Methoden zu Berechnung der Impedanz wie: Sinus-
Algorithmen, Algorithmen basierend auf der Leitungs-Differentialgleichung 
erster oder zweiter Ordnung, Filteralgorithmen für Berechnung komplexer 
Zeiger, und Algorithmen, die auf künstliche Intelligenz basieren, wie 
harmonisch aktivierte neuronale Netze. Die unterschiedlichen Typen von 
Netzschutzprinzipien, die untersucht wurden sind: Überstrom, Distanz und 
Differenzial. Einige Untersuchungen wurden auch im Netzschutzlabor der 
Universität durchgeführt. Bei beiden Tests konnte nachgewiesen werden, 
dass die heutigen state-of-the-art Netzschutzsysteme durch Harmonische 
entsprechend IEC 61000-3–2, praktisch nicht beeinflusst werden. 
Der zweite Problemkreis der in dieser Arbeit diskutiert wird sind die 
Anforderungen, welche die Anbindung von DER an das Netz, an moderne 
Netzschutzsysteme stellen. Einige Beispiele illustrieren die Lage der 
Energieversorgung der Zukunft und zeigen Selektivitätsprobleme auf, 
sollten nur konventionelle Netzschutzsysteme benutzt werden. In dieser 
Arbeit wird ein neues Schutzkonzept für Mittelspannungsnetze mit hohem 
Anteil an DER vorgestellt und analysiert. Das Konzept beruht auf der 
neuen Norm für „Substation Automatisation System - IEC 61850“ und 
einem Netzschutz-Managementsystem. Die Methode der zusätzlichen 
Signal-Einspeisung wurde ebenfalls vorgestellt.  
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Die Basis eines effizienten Netzschutz-Managementsystems ist das Wissen 
vom Verhalten des Systems in normalen Betrieb und unter 
Fehlerbedingungen. Die Computer- und Internettechnologie, die moderne 
Kommunikation, der interdisziplinäre Datenaustausch stellen ganz neue 
Anforderungen an die Wissensbasis energietechnischer Ingenieure.  
Mit dem Ziel neue Medien in der Ingenieurausbildung einzusetzen ist, im 
Rahmen dieser Arbeit ein E-learning Kurs entwickelt worden. Dabei 
ermöglicht das Internet neue Methoden zur Wissensvermittlung zu 
entwickeln. Die Unabhängigkeit von Zeit und Ort, die große Anzahl von 
Lehrmöglichkeiten und die Online-Diskussionen sind nur einige zu 
nennende Vorteile. In dieser Arbeit ist die Idee zur Realisierung sowie 
Ergebnisse des E-learning Kurses im Bereich digitaler Netzschutztechnik, 
als Erweiterung der konventionellen Lehrveranstaltung präsentiert 
worden. Dieser Kurs wird den Studenten der Universität in einem speziell 
gestalteten Multimedialabor angeboten. Es besteht via Internet die 
Möglichkeit den Kurses z.B. zu Hause zur Wiederholung und 
Prüfungsvorbereitung nochmals zu bearbeiten. 
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